Index
A
ABAI. See American-British Agreed Intelligence (ABAI)
Abbott, Douglas, 90
ABC. See American-British-Canadian (ABC) planners
ABCI. See American-British-Canadian Intelligence (ABCI)
ACAI. See American-Canadian Agreed Intelligence (ACAI)
ADC. See Air Defence Command (ADC, Canada); Air Defense Command (ADC, US)
aide-mémoire (US), 135–136, 138, 144
air defence, 12, 19, 22, 118–119, 136–138
Air Defence Command (ADC, Canada), 118, 126, 137
Air Defense Command (ADC, US), 116–117, 118, 126, 137
air power, 47–48, 50–51, 58–60, 61, 71
airplane detector equipment, 12
Alanbrooke, Field Marshall Lord, 18
ALE messages, 154, 156, 162, 163–164, 167, 173–174
Alert, Nunavut, 173
alerts. See also ALE messages
intelligence vs. operational, 125, 156
procedures agreements, 134–136
trilateral discussions, 140–144
Alsop, Joseph, 43
American behaviour theories
desire for preventive war, 79, 101–102
galvanized by Korean invasion, 84
isolationism, 22
overestimation of Soviet Union, 20
oversensitivity to Soviet actions, 18
“provocative statements,” 97, 100
in shifting balance of power, 40
in views of diplomats and journalists, 42–44, 91
American Telegraph and Telephone cable repair, 168
American-British Agreed Intelligence (ABAI)
ABAI 5 “Soviet Intentions and Capabilities,” 58, 62, 63–64
American-British-Canadian (ABC) planners
ABC-22 “Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan,” 11, 23
ABCI 15 “Soviet Intentions and Capabilities,” 65–72
intelligence discussions and conference, 60–65
American-Canadian Agreed Intelligence (ACAI)
assessments, 48
“Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action . . . 1949–1956” (ACAI 5), 55–60
Amory, Robert
bilateral alert talks, 138–139
on intelligence sharing, 133, 135, 156
on tripartite alerts system, 159–160, 165, 166
Amyot, Paul E., 153
Anderson, William, 33
Anglo-American relationships, 8, 9, 10, 11, 64–65
appreciations (assessments)
“An Appreciation of the Possible Military Threat to the Security of Canada and the United States” (JIC 3/48), 49–52
“Appreciation of the Requirements for Canadian-United States Security” (MCC), 25
defined, 23
no agreed Government view, 84
sharing, 100
team composition requirement, 31–32, 35
tripartite participation, 60–63
Arctic defence measures, 34, 37
Argus nuclear test explosion, 168
arms race, 34
Armstrong, Park, 117, 137–138, 139, 146–147
Asia
Communist powers, 177
concerns about American action in, 134
Associated Press, 130
atomic bombs. See also nuclear weapons
in appreciations, 50–51, 57, 66
intelligence about, 33
program espionage, 25
B
Barnes, Tracey, 153
Basic National Security Policy, 112
Basic Security Plan (BSP), 25, 33, 47–48, 52, 55
Bean, W. W., 62, 63, 64–65, 70, 77
Berlin
Blockade, 108
and Soviet Union, 103
Bermuda conference, 143–144, 145
bilateral alerts, 136–140, 146
BJSM. See British Joint Staff Mission (BJSM)
Bowen, Ivor
on intelligence sharing, 114, 115, 117, 149–150, 166, 169
on interpretation of intelligence, 145
meeting with McCone, 171
on risks of war, 101
“The Continuing Need for Indications Intelligence,” 158
British behaviour theories
potential war between UK and Russia, 21
British Joint Staff Mission (BJSM), 128, 155
British Red Book, 155
BROILER (war plan), 52
BSP. See Basic Security Plan (BSP)
budgets
intelligence spending surge, 180
BULLMOOSE (war plan), 52
Burgess, Woodbury M., 116
C
“C” (Sir John Sinclair), 118, 119
Cabell, Charles P., 141–142, 145, 163
Cabinet Defence Committee (CDC)
on alerts consultation, 140
in Cuban Missile Crisis, 174
and defence planning, 27–28, 33, 55, 72
Cabinet War Committee (CWC), 21, 22
Camp X (Ontario), 151
Campney, Ralph, 140
Canada
alert communications procedures, 154
budget speeches, 90
geographical exposure, 17, 19–20, 21–22, 34
intelligence spending, 180
and Korean War, 81
and Military Cooperation Committee paper, 27–29
overview of officials’ views and actions, 4–5
US military in, 12–13, 19, 22, 23
US overflights agreement, 136
Canadian Indications Room, 131–132, 138, 144. See also Joint Indications Room (JIR (Canada))
Canadian Joint Staff in Washington (CJSW), 12, 20–21
Canol pipeline, 12
Carter, Thomas L., 90
CAS. See Chief of the Air Staff (CAS)
Castro, Fidel, 171
CBNRC. See Communications Branch, National Research Council (CBNRC)
CDC. See Cabinet Defence Committee (CDC)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). See also Amory, Robert; Dulles, Allen
and Canadian appreciations, 100
communications channels, 144–145, 153
indications intelligence coverage, 111–112
on intelligence sharing, 133, 135, 171–172
and tripartite alerts system, 142, 154, 163
Central Intelligence Group (CIG), 28, 30–31
CGS. See Chief of the General Staff (CGS)
Chair, Chiefs of Staff (CCOS), 117. See also Foulkes, Charles
Check List Group (US), 108–109
check lists, 107, 108. See also indicator lists
Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), 21, 33, 47
Chief of the General Staff (CGS), 82, 84. See also Foulkes, Charles
Chiefs of Staff (UK), 63
“The Likelihood of Total War up to the End of 1954,” 98–99
Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC)
on Canada’s exclusion in bilateral talks, 11
composition and tasks, 20
on “imminence of war” papers, 94, 100–101
intelligence alert system, 127
on Joint Indications Room, 145
and political appreciations, 39
Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC) documents
CSC 31(50), 84
“The Imminence of War” CSC 20(50), 78–81
“The Imminence of War” CSC 22(50), 81–84
China, 79, 84–85, 130–131, 142, 160–161. See also Sino-Soviet Bloc actions
CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
CIG. See Central Intelligence Group (CIG)
cipher equipment, 151, 152–153
civilian oversight of defence, 25, 32
Claxton, Brooke, 34–35, 55, 80–81, 86, 89, 90
Cline, Ray, 172
codewords, 124, 150, 152, 159, 161–162
Colorado Springs facility, 111, 112, 116
Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), 11–12
COMINT (Communications Intelligence), 118
Communications Branch, National Research Council (CBNRC), 118, 137, 151, 152, 153
communications channels, 126, 132, 146, 151–154, 157, 167–169, 178–179
communism
American fight against, 81
clash with capitalism dogma, 97
Czechoslovakia coup, 52
opposition in Soviet Union, 96
in Soviet intentions, 66, 72, 73, 74, 75, 93
consultation policy
in agreements, 10, 134–135, 136, 137, 139–140, 144
and Canada’s exclusion, 11, 63
in indications of war procedures, 127
in nuclear deployment decisions, 121–122
containment policy, 37, 42, 81
“The Continuing Need for Indications Intelligence” (Bowen), 158
Cook, Geoffrey, 171
crash (emergency) meetings, 119, 131, 132
Crean, G. G. “Bill”
on appreciation papers, 29–30, 32, 57, 59
bilateral alert talks, 138–139
communications implementation, 150–153
on indications intelligence, 116–117, 118–119, 123, 125–126, 127–128
on intelligence sharing, 135
on Soviet intentions, 92
trilateral alert talks, 141–144, 145–146
on trilateral intelligence discussions, 61, 62
Crerar, Harry, 11
CRITICOMM, 178
CSC. See Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC)
Current Intelligence Indications and Briefing Section (CIIB), 177
“The Current Risks of General War” (JIC 64/1(53)), 102–103, 104
“The Current Risks of War” (JIC 42/2(51)), 95–98
“The Current Risks of War” (JIC 42/3(52)), 100
CWC. See Cabinet War Committee (CWC)
Czechoslovakia Communist coup, 52, 108
D
DAI. See Director of Air Intelligence (DAI)
DEA. See Department of External Affairs (DEA)
Dean, Sir Patrick
alerts discussions, 132–133, 140–141
communications channel implementation, 150–151, 153
on indications intelligence, 119, 123, 128–129
on nuclear retaliation procedures, 155
tripartite agreement, 142–143, 145–146
tripartite alerts terms of use, 155–156, 165–166
defence planning. See also Basic Security Plan (BSP)
Canada-US interdependence, 19, 22, 23–25, 32, 34–35
and offence planning, 31, 47–48, 54–55
Defence Research Board, 47, 80
Department of External Affairs (DEA). See also Crean, G. G. “Bill”; Pearson, Lester; Reid, Escott
on American action and Soviet reaction, 113
on bilateral alert system, 135, 137
collaborations with State Department, 31, 35, 36–38
communications channels, 152
on “The Current Risks of War,” 95–96
“Imminence of War” drafts, 78, 92–94, 98
joins Joint Intelligence Committee, 20
on likelihood of war, 84, 89, 94, 101–103
on Military Cooperation Committee papers, 28–29
on military thinking, 32, 87–88
on “national development,” 9
“Political Appreciation,” 36, 38–39
“Political Factors in the Likelihood of War with the Soviet Union,” 74–76
urged to participate in studies, 53
Department of Finance, 90
Department of National Defence (DND). See also Claxton, Brooke
on atomic bombs, 71
on imminence of war, 94
Indications of War Room, 111
intelligence alert system, 127, 140
Intelligence Division, 177
on Soviet intentions, 85
spending goals, 101
war planning, 87
Diefenbaker, John, 147, 167, 172, 174, 175
diplomatic corps
communications channels, 152, 153
in intelligence indications procedures, 169–170
on Soviet intentions, 21, 26, 41–43, 91–92
Director of Air Intelligence (DAI), 77–78, 92–94, 110–111, 139, 173
Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), 73, 82, 114, 116, 117
Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), 114, 129, 173
Director of Scientific Intelligence (DSI), 78, 114
DMI. See Director of Military Intelligence (DMI)
DND. See Department of National Defence (DND)
DNI. See Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI)
DOUBLEQUICK (war plan), 52
Drury, Charles “Bud,” 94
DSI. See Director of Scientific Intelligence (DSI)
Duff, Anthony, 164
Dulles, Allen
and Indications Centre, 144–145
on intelligence sharing, 118
tripartite alerts terms of use, 165–167
on tripartite discussions, 141, 142, 145–146, 147
Dulles, John Foster, 122, 128, 132–133, 140, 143
E
Eayrs, James, 5
Eden, Anthony, 121–122, 123, 126
Edwards, RCAF Group Captain, 114
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 112, 141, 143, 145, 147
Elbrick, C. Burke, 133–134, 137
espionage and counterespionage, 25, 113, 129, 149, 172, 174
“Estimate of Soviet Postwar Intentions and Capabilities” (JIC (US)), 18
F
FALLEX 62 (NATO exercise), 170
firmness policy, 42
Five Eyes intelligence community, 179
FLEETWOOD (war plan), 52
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 130
Formosa Straits, 166
Fortress North America, 22, 24, 38
Foulkes, Charles
on futility of Soviet intention studies, 94
intelligence briefing room, 115
on tripartite alerts system, 167
on tripartite discussions, 143
on war planning, 40, 47, 52–53
FROLIC (war plan), 52
G
G-2 (United States Army military intelligence), 117
GCHQ. See Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
general war
air vs. ground, 47
alerts system on, 159
and Korean War, 79
from miscalculations, 97, 102–104, 158
Germany, 86, 167. See also Berlin
Glazebrook, George
on aide-mémoire (US), 135
on bilateral information discussions, 137–138, 140
on Canadian Indications Centre, 144, 146
on Indications Project, 116
on Soviet intentions papers, 74
Goodman, Michael, 110
Gouzenko, Igor, 25
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), 132, 152
H
HALFMOON (war plan), 52, 63–64
Hayter, William, 60
Heeney, Arnold
on defence planning, 37
in intelligence sharing discussions, 128–129, 140
on “risks of war” assessments, 29, 95, 101
on Soviet intentions, 80
Hickerson, John, 32
HICKORY (war plan), 69
Hillenkoetter, R. H., 109
Horsey, Outerbridge, 137
Hydra communications hub, 132, 151
I
IAC. See Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC)
ICBM. See Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
imminence of war
DEA concerns about, 87
factors and situations, 82–83, 175
systematic reviews and tracking, 85–86
imminence of war, papers and documents related to
“Imminence of War” (DAI), 77–78
“The Imminence of War” (CSC 20(50)), 78–81
“The Imminence of War” (CSC 22(50)), 81–84
“The Imminence of War” (JIC 20(51)), 92–95
“The International Situation” (JIC (Ottawa)), 89–92
indications intelligence, papers and documents related to
“Indications Intelligence” (JIC 135/1(55)), 131–132
“Indications Intelligence: Communications and Watch Procedures” (JIC 278(58)), 157
“Indications of Russian Preparedness for War” (JIC (London)), 108
“The ‘Indications’ Project,” JIC 89(53), 115–116
“Possible Stages of Action when Indications of Major Russian Aggression are Received in Good Time,” 126–129
indications intelligence tracking systems. See also Joint Indications Room (JIR (Canada)); Joint Indications Room (JIR (UK))
American implementations, 108–110, 111–114
British implementations, 110, 123–125, 147
Canadian implementations, 107–108, 110–111, 117, 131–132, 145
indications of war
British scenarios, 124
vs. friendly forces activities, 150
indicator lists, 115, 156, 159, 160–161, 168, 169–170, 177–178
intelligence
assessment team composition, 31–32
availability of, 25–26, 27–28, 61, 82, 129
Canadian deficiencies, 42, 56–57
“critical” as defined in Tripartite Alerts System, 161
intelligence (continued)
gathering, 130
records declassification, 4, 5, 179–180
timeliness of, 113, 117, 118–119, 123–126, 170–171
Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), 108–109, 112, 135–136, 146, 179–180
intelligence assessments. See appreciations
intelligence rooms. See rooms
intelligence sharing
American responses to, 132–136
American-British-Canadian planners, 61
and Joint Intelligence Committee Liaison Officers, 167
on marginal and developing situations, 164–167
security and secrecy of, 149–150
“Intelligence Warning of Military Attack on North America” (JIC 443/2(62)), 170–171
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), 158
“The International Situation” (JIC (Ottawa)), 89–92
Iran, 36
Iraq, 162
“Is War with Russia Inevitable?” (Kennan), 73
J
JCS. See Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
JIB. See Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB)
JIC. See Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC (London)); Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC (Ottawa)); Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC (US))
JICLO. See Joint Intelligence Committee Liaison Officers
JIG. See Joint Intelligence Group (JIG)
JIR. See Joint Indications Room (JIR (Canada)); Joint Indications Room (JIR (UK))
JIS. See Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS)
JISC. See Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JISC)
“Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan” (ABC-22), 11
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 23, 28, 63, 113, 134–135
Joint Indications Room (JIR (Canada))
implementation, 145, 146, 153, 156–157, 162, 173, 177
“Joint Indication Room: Standing Orders” (JIC 378/1 (60)), 170
“Joint Indication Room: Standing Orders” JIC 471(63), 177
Joint Indications Room (JIR (UK)), 146, 157, 167
Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), 101, 114, 130–131, 145, 149–150
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC (London))
on ABCI 15, 71
intelligence alerts, 119, 123–125, 164
intelligence reviews, 110
invites Canadian participation, 61
on Soviet interests and intentions, 18, 25–26, 99
on transatlantic communications vulnerability, 168–169
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC (London)) documents
“Indications of Russian Preparedness for War,” 108
“Likelihood of General War with the Soviet Union up to the End of 1955” (JIC (53)79 (Final)), 103, 104
“Likelihood of Total War with the Soviet Union up to the End of 1954” (JIC (451)103 (Final)), 96
“The Likelihood of War with the Soviet Union . . . ” (JIC (50)7), 74
“Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions,” 25–26
“Soviet Intentions and Capabilities, 1950–1954” (with JIC (US)), 88–89
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC (Ottawa))
and ACAI 5, 60
Canadian Indications Room, 131–132, 144–145
communications channels, 152
and Cuban Missile Crisis, 173–175
in FALLEX 62 exercise, 170
indications intelligence reviews and tracking system, 85–86, 107, 111
indications of war project, 114–116, 117
intelligence alert systems, 125–130, 162, 163, 166–167
Soviet intentions request, 72
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC (Ottawa)) documents
“A Review of the Risks of War” (JIC 58(52)), 100–101
“An Appreciation of the Possible Military Threat to the Security of Canada and the United States” (JIC 3/48), 49–52
“An Outline of Soviet Capabilities and Strategic Objectives in a War Beginning before July, 1949” (JIC 4/48), 53–54
“The Current Risks of General War” (JIC 64/1(53)), 102–103, 104
“The Current Risks of War” (JIC 42/2(51)), 95–98, 99
“The Current Risks of War” (JIC 42/3(52)), 100
“Indications Intelligence” (JIC 135/1(55)), 131–132
“Indications Intelligence: Communications and Watch Procedures” (JIC 278(58)), 157
“Intelligence Warning of Military Attack on North America” (JIC 443/2(62)), 170–171
“The International Situation,” 89–92
“Joint Indication Room: Standing Orders” (JIC 378/1 (60)), 170
“Joint Indication Room: Standing Orders” (JIC 471(63)), 177
“An Outline of Soviet Capabilities and Strategic Objectives in a War Beginning before July, 1949” (JIC 4/48), 53–54
“Probable Enemy Activities Prior to the Outbreak of War” (JIC 312/2(59)), 169, 170
“A Review of the Risks of War” (JIC 58(52)), 100–101
“Strategic Appreciation of the Capabilities of the U.S.S.R. to attack the North American Continent,” 29–30
“The Imminence of War” (JIC 20(51)), 92–95
“The International Situation” (JIC (Ottawa)), 89–92
“Tripartite Alerts System” (JIC 1103/1(58)), 159–160, 166
“Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement” (JIC 543(66) (Final)), 177
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC (US))
assessments of future war, 28
“Estimate of Soviet Postwar Intentions and Capabilities,” 18
“Soviet Intentions and Capabilities, 1950–1954” (with JIC (London)), 88–89
Joint Intelligence Committee Liaison Officers (JICLO), 154, 157, 162–164, 167
Joint Intelligence Group (JIG), 55–58
Joint Intelligence Map Room (UK), 123
Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS)
“Current Risks of War” redraft, 97–98
indications of war project, 114, 115
“An Outline of Soviet Capabilities and Strategic Objectives in a War Beginning before July, 1949” (JIC 4/48), 53–54
Soviet intention appreciation, 72–73
Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JISC), 107
Joint Planning Committee (JPC), 31, 39–40, 81–82
Joint War Plans Committee, 52
Jones, Paul, 163
Jordan, 162
JPC. See Joint Planning Committee (JPC)
K
Kellogg Pact, 43
Kennan, George, 26, 28, 36–37, 73
Kennedy, John F., 172, 173, 174
King, Mackenzie, 10, 19–20, 33–34
Korean War
and general war, 7, 77–79, 80–82, 159
L
La Guardia, Fiorella, 11
Lebanon, 162
Léger, Jules, 134, 136–137, 146–147
Leitrim (Ottawa Wireless Station), 132, 152, 153
“Likelihood of General War with the Soviet Union up to the End of 1955” (UK JIC (53)79 (Final)), 103, 104
“Likelihood of the Deliberate Initiation of Full-Scale War by the USSR against the US and Its Western Allies Prior to the End of 1952” (NIE 48), 98, 99
“The Likelihood of Total War up to the End of 1954” (COS (52)285, UK), 98–99
“Likelihood of Total War with the Soviet Union up to the End of 1954” (JIC (451)103 (Final), London), 96
“The Likelihood of War with the Soviet Union . . . ” (JIC (50)7 (London)), 74
London Indicator Centre, 126–127
“Long Telegram” (Kennan), 26
M
Macmillan, Harold, 132, 141, 143, 145
Marshall, George, 91
MAYHEM (codeword), 159
MC48 (NATO strategy document), 121
MCC. See Military Cooperation Committee (MCC)
McCardle, J. M., 171–172, 173, 174
McCordick, J. A., 96
McCoy, Tim, 70
mechanization/machinery
and Watch Committee, 110, 111, 130, 131
Menzies, Arthur, 91
Merchant, Livingston, 133, 172
Middle East crises, 162, 163, 164
Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), 25, 26–29, 49, 51–52, 55, 59
Ministry of Defence (UK), 123, 132
miscalculations and accidents, 97, 100, 102–103, 104, 113, 150, 175
missiles, 141, 158, 171, 172, 177
Murray, Ralph, 123
N
National Indications Center (NIC), 113, 118, 130–131, 134, 141, 170
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
“Likelihood of the Deliberate Initiation of Full-Scale War by the USSR against the US and Its Western Allies Prior to the End of 1952” (NIE 48), 98, 99
“Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US” (NIE 11-3-57), 149–150
on Soviet intentions, 86
National Security Agency (NSA), 118, 132, 137, 152, 153
National Security Council (NSC), 112–113, 129
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
NIC. See National Indications Center (NIC)
NIE. See National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
1946 draft appreciation (MCC), 26–29, 49, 51–52
North America
American defence strategy for, 37–38
“Intelligence Warning of Military Attack on North America” (JIC 443/2(62)), 170–171
vulnerability assessments, 22–24, 27, 30, 33
North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), 162, 163
North Atlantic Alliance, 69
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
establishment, 48–49, 61–62, 63, 69–70, 71–72
FALLEX 62 exercise, 170
and intelligence alerts, 126–127, 128, 156
nuclear attack strategy (MC48), 121–122
threats to participants, 86, 159, 163–164
and trilateral discussions, 142, 146, 147
North Atlantic Triangle, 8
NSA. See National Security Agency (NSA)
NSC. See National Security Council (NSC)
nuclear retaliation procedures (UK-US), 155
nuclear war survival exercises, 170
nuclear weapons. See also atomic bombs
decision to launch process, 121–122, 134
and risk of war, 104
smuggled into North America, 171
test explosions, 48, 65, 103, 168
O
Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), 28
“ORE 1: Soviet Foreign and Military Policy” (Office of Reports and Estimates), 28
OFFTACKLE (war plan), 69
oil pipelines, 12
“An Outline of Soviet Capabilities and Strategic Objectives in a War Beginning before July, 1949” (JIC 4/48), 53–54
P
Parsons, J. Graham, 24
PCO. See Privy Council Office (PCO)
Pearkes, George, 167
Pearson, Lester
on alerts systems, 122–123, 140
on Canada’s exclusion in wartime, 10, 11
on global war plan, 47
on imminence of war, 89, 90, 91
joint appreciation and basic security plan development, 36, 39
on Korean situation, 81
on possibility of general war, 86
reassurances to Mackenzie King, 44
Pentagon, 69, 130, 131, 133, 134–135, 143
Perkins, George, 133
Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD), 10–11, 19–20, 23–24, 31
PHP. See Post-Hostilities Planning (PHP) Committees
PJBD. See Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD)
“Political Appreciation” (DEA), 35–36, 38–39
“Political Factors in the Likelihood of War with the Soviet Union” (DEA), 74–76
Pope, Maurice, 12, 23–24, 40, 41, 91–92
“Possible Stages of Action when Indications of Major Russian Aggression are Received in Good Time” (UK), 126–129
Post-Hostilities Planning (PHP) Committees, 17, 18–19, 20, 21
Privy Council Office (PCO), 29, 143, 168
“Probable Enemy Activities Prior to the Outbreak of War” (JIC 312/2(59)), 169, 170
“Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US” (NIE 11-3-57), 149–150
“Procedures Preceding Attack by United States Retaliatory Forces from the United Kingdom” (TIAA), 155
R
Radford, Arthur W., 134–135, 143
RAF. See Royal Air Force (RAF)
RCAF. See Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)
Reid, Escott
on political appreciations, 39, 49
on Soviet intentions papers, 74
on US balance of power, 40, 41
“Report of Tripartite Working Group on Tripartite Alert System,” 160
“A Review of the Risks of War” (JIC 58(52)), 100–101
Roberts, Frank, 26
Robertson, Norman, 29, 142, 172
Rockex cipher machine, 152–153, 154
rooms. See also Joint Indications Room (JIR (Canada)); Joint Indications Room (JIR (UK))
Air Defense Command (Colorado Springs), 111, 112, 116–117, 118
in Canadian discussions, 111, 115, 129
Canadian Indications Room, 131–132, 138, 144
Indications Room (USAF), 114, 130
Joint Intelligence Map Room (UK), 123
London Indicator Centre, 126–127
National Indications Center (US), 113, 118, 130–131, 141
Watch Room (CIA building), 109
Royal Air Force (RAF), 28, 59, 124
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), 58, 114–115, 137, 173
“Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions” (JIC (London)), 25–26
S
SAC. See Strategic Air Command (SAC)
SACEUR. See Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)
Samford, John, 139
Second World War
experiences and lessons, 9–13, 22–24
and post hostilities planning, 17, 20
Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), 36
Sheldon, Huntington “Ting,” 112, 117, 163, 165
signals intelligence, 118, 132, 173, 179
Sinclair, Sir John (“C”), 118, 119
Sino-Soviet Bloc actions, 160–161, 166, 177
Smith, Walter Bedell, 112
SNIE. See Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)
Solandt, Omond, 80
Southam, Hamilton, 160
Soviet intention and behaviour theories
British theory, 18
in responses to Escott Reid’s memorandum, 41–42
tie-down of American forces in Asia, 85
Soviet intention indicators, 124, 129, 170–171, 174
Soviet intentions and capabilities, papers and documents related to
“Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions” (JIC (London)), 25–26
“Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action . . . 1949–1956” (ACAI 5), 55–60
“Soviet Foreign and Military Policy” (ORE1), 28
“Soviet Intentions and Capabilities . . . ” (ABCI 15), 65–72
“Soviet Intentions and Capabilities” (ABAI 5), 58, 62, 63–64
“Soviet Intentions and Capabilities, 1950–1954” (US and UK), 88–89
Soviet satellite countries, 96
Soviet trawler MV Novorossisk, 168–169
Soviet Union
espionage and counterespionage, 113
and Korean War, 97
military capability assessments, 49–52, 58–60, 61
post-war activities, 25, 30, 48, 65, 82–83, 103
as threat to North America, 17–18
in tripartite alerts system indicators, 160–161
Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE)
on intention of Communist rulers (SNIE11-54), 104
Watch system (SNIE 11-8-54), 113
SPEEDWAY (war plan), 52
SSEA. See Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA)
St. Laurent, Louis, 36
Stacey, C. P., 12
Stalin, Joseph, 25, 97, 101, 103
Standing Group (NATO), 121, 127
State Department (US)
aide-mémoire, 135
bilateral alert talks, 137–140
distrust of military thinking, 32
on indications intelligence, 108, 109
participation in assessments, 31
views on Soviet threat, 28, 91
Steele, A. J., 144
Strategic Air Command (SAC), 136, 162
“Strategic Appreciation of the Capabilities of the U.S.S.R. to attack the North American Continent” (JIC (Ottawa)), 29–30
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), 121, 122
T
third nation information, 132
TIAA. See Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement (TIAA)
Todd, W. E., 61, 62, 63, 64, 71
transatlantic communications cables, 151, 167–169
Tripartite Alert(s) Communications System
during Cuban Missile Crisis, 173
elements and procedures, 160–162
terms of use, 155–156, 159–160, 163–167
Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement (TIAA)
communications implementations, 150–154
nuclear retaliation procedures, 155
trilateral discussions, 140–145
“Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement” (JIC 543(66) (Final)), 177
Truman, Harry, 47, 58, 65, 108
trust and distrust
in ABC-22 negotiations, 11
towards military thinking, 32
U
UN. See United Nations (UN)
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (USSEA), 29, 53, 80, 85, 95, 134
United Kingdom
alert communications procedures, 154
embassy in Ottawa, 160
intelligence check lists, 108
Ministry of Defence (UK), 123, 132
United Nations (UN), 79, 80, 85, 91, 159
United States
aide-mémoire, 135–136, 138, 144
alert communications procedures, 154
containment/firmness policy, 37, 42, 81
indications intelligence tracking systems, 107, 111–114, 125
and Korean War, 78, 80, 81, 83–84
military facilities in Canada, 12–13, 19, 22, 23
military facilities in United Kingdom, 141
nuclear weapons, 7
United States Air Force (USAF)
Air Defence Command, 111, 118, 126
Colorado Springs facility, 112, 116–117, 137
Wide-Band Tropospheric Forward Scatter System, 169
United States Intelligence Board (USIB), 163, 166
USAF. See United States Air Force (USAF)
USIB. See United States Intelligence Board (USIB)
USSEA. See Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (USSEA)
W
war. See also general war; imminence of war; Second World War
war planning
1947-1948 joint plans, 52
American vs. Canadian vision, 22–24, 39–40
global, 58
imperatives for, 21
war rooms. See rooms
war scenarios
in appreciation papers, 67–68, 96–98
Mackenzie King’s fears, 34
in North America, 27
Washington Times, 43
Watch Committee
development and expansion, 108, 109–110, 111–112, 113–114, 129, 130–131
intelligence sharing, 117–118, 137, 139, 155, 174
Watch Room, 109
Weiser, William, 58
Wershof, Max, 96
Western powers, 74, 83, 93, 101, 102
Whitely, John, 128
Wilgress, Dana, 18, 21, 26, 42, 44, 96–98