2 The Implementation Gap for Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Lands and Territories in Latin America (1991–2019)

Ritsuko Funaki

Introduction

The last two decades of the 20^th century saw a rise in Indigenous social movements in several Latin American countries. New constitutional claims led to a recognition of the demands for the rights embodied in political and territorial autonomy (Van Cott, 2001, pp. 30–31).

Academic researchers and international organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank have noted considerable variation in the extent of the claims included in the new constitutions in the region that, in response to demands, now recognize the rights of Indigenous peoples, as well as in the degree of progress in related legislation (Barié, 2003; Iturralde, 2011). At the same time, as the then United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Rodolfo Stavenhagen (2006) warned in his report, there is a large “implementation gap” between the content of the constitutional texts and their application in practice.

While sufficient and consistent legislation is an essential precondition for applying the rights established in the constitution, the “main problem” in this implementation gap, according to the Special Rapporteur, is “administrative, legal and political practice” that violates the formally recognized rights of Indigenous peoples (Stavenhagen, 2006, par. 83).

Experts monitoring this reality have thoroughly analyzed this gap, focusing on the noteworthy cases of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Nicaragua, among others (Aylwin, 2012; Muñoz, 2016; Ortiz, 2010, 2015; Tockman & Cameron, 2014). If we know, then, that no country in Latin America is fully complying with what it has promised, what is the relevance of the struggles for constitutional reform to address the claims of Indigenous peoples? It would not seem to make any sense to seek a legal guarantee of Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination in a modern state in which constitutionality, ironically, has no real impact on improving these communities’ situations.

Nonetheless, if we look at the issue from a constructivist perspective, it is only natural that no country has automatically become what is set forth in its reformed constitution; such a transformation always requires a process of large-scale social learning. The challenge is to find a way to implement these new rules of the game to improve the conditions of coexistence among different Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples and nations.

To advance this objective, this chapter first asks how big the implementation gaps are in the Latin American countries that have made progress in legalizing Indigenous peoples’ rights. Answering this question is indeed a challenge according to Inguanzo, a Spanish political scientist who carried out a comparative analysis of the legal recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights in countries in Southeast Asia. In her book, Inguanzo (2016) indicates that “these gaps are tied to particular local (and even personal) experiences, such that carrying out a rigorous comparative analysis of such great magnitude becomes immense and unfeasible” (p. 16). In line with Inguanzo’s methodological perspective, then, this article proposes a way to carry out a comparative analysis of the gaps in the Latin American cases that have already begun the implementation phase.

The methodological foundation for this study is the logic of fuzzy sets — more specifically, Fuzzy Set-Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). However, I do not carry out an fsQCA here in this paper. Instead, due to the lack of available data on the dependent variable — or in QCA terms, the lack of results that show the degrees of the phenomenon under study, the implementation gap — I will carry out the fsQCA in the next phase of my research.

The fsQCA methodology permits an analysis of the causal complexity of social phenomena that include conjunctural causation and equifinality. The first attribute suggests that influencing a certain group of factors yields a specific result; however, this same result would not be achieved without the presence and interaction of this group of factors. In other words, it allows variables to not be independent, as statistical methodology otherwise assumes.

The second attribute, equifinality, is a presupposition that there are different pathways and combinations of factors that can lead to the same result. The methodology, then, while allowing for the complexity of social realities, enables us to identify general rules through systematic comparison based on mathematical theories such as Boolean algebra and set theory (Ragin, 1987; Schneider & Wagenman, 2012).

The first phase of this research seeks to identify the conditions that hinder the effective functioning of institutions for Indigenous self-determination. Thus, it is of great importance to first measure the gaps with full awareness of how complicated this phenomenon is.

Creating an index that can compare the different cases across the region has both advantages and disadvantages. The greatest advantage is the ability to ask, for the first time, the following question: Why does the implementation gap persist to a great extent in some countries while less so in others? We may thus discover which conditions affect the implementation of Indigenous peoples’ rights from a comparative perspective. At the same time, one of the greatest disadvantages is the considerable loss of information about each of the cases subject to comparison. As explained in the following paragraph, facilitating this comparative analysis requires operationalizing and, inevitably, simplifying the concepts that comprise the gap, yet without losing sight of their essence.

As mentioned above, positioning the countries and their different levels of implementation requires operationalizing the qualities that reflect diverse aspects of non-compliance according to objective references. In this regard, Bennagen’s instructions, delivered at a meeting of experts organized by the United Nations in 1991, shall serve as a guideline. The purpose of the UN meeting was to review the experiences of countries around the world with internal Indigenous autonomous governments. The Filipino anthropologist suggested that there are certain general values that have crystallized throughout the development of Indigenous peoples’ movements for self-determination and that these can serve as a standard for evaluating concrete situations of Indigenous autonomy. Bennagen (1992, p. 72) identified five operational features to consider:

• Control of territory and its natural resources;
• The inclusion of corresponding Indigenous institutions in legislative, executive and judicial bodies;
• Proper actual representation of the Indigenous cultural communities in the various organs of power, not only in the autonomous territorial unit but also in the national government;
• Fiscal autonomy (including the power to raise revenues), a just share of national revenues and a capable fiscal administration; and
• Respect, protection and development of Indigenous cultures.

The original plan for this study was to analyze these five areas qualitatively to then develop a comprehensive implementation index. However, upon review of the information available in the preliminary research phase, I concluded that a huge amount of qualitative data would be needed to examine each of Bennagen’s suggested features, which would not be feasible to investigate within the time and space available for this chapter.

Therefore, to prevent an inevitably superficial assessment, this study focuses on a single feature. Given its most essential and controversial significance, I analyze the first element of Indigenous autonomy; that is, the control of territories and natural resources.

Methodology

The procedure for selecting which cases to analyze was as follows: First, I collected legal information (established up to the end of 2018) for the seventeen Latin American countries in the region. Second, I reviewed their constitutions and laws related to Indigenous peoples’ rights.¹ In this initial phase, I looked not only at rights to lands and territories but also at rights to autonomy and self-determination; that is, the second and third areas proposed by Bennagen. I have thus ensured that the countries analyzed have the legal foundation for an autonomous regime as well as access to land. Nonetheless, in the next phase I focused specifically on the implementation gap with respect to land rights.

Based on the legal research mentioned above (see Table 2.1), I selected ten countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. These countries have political-administrative or community-based entities with the legal status to exercise Indigenous autonomy, as well as the legal guarantee of collective ownership for Indigenous peoples.

Sources

The database for this study consists of the documents published by different international organizations that monitor and promote the implementation of Indigenous peoples’ rights.

The first of such document collects the comments of the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Commission of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR)² (see Annex 1, Table 2.6 for CEACR citations hereinafter). This commission publishes comments in two forms: Observations and Direct Requests. The Observations are generally used for the most serious cases of non-compliance of a country’s obligations. The Direct Requests, in contrast, mainly address technical questions and help qualify certain points that government reports do not explain with sufficient details and examples. I have also reviewed reports by the tripartite committee established to examine Complaints. These reports are published when there are allegations that provisions of an agreement have been violated.

Taking advantage of the characteristics of these documents, which make it possible to identify cases of non-compliance through a filter of international norms, I analyzed the comments and reports related to the implementation of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (C169). This agreement was adopted in 1989 and entered into effect in 1991.

Twenty-three states ratified the agreement, including all the countries analyzed in this study except for Panama. For the case of Panama, I consulted the documents on Convention 107, which precedes C169 and is equally useful for obtaining similar information.

Although these documents have the great advantage of being recognized as a reliable official source for studying different situations, we must be careful about their possible disadvantages. When there is a serious problem with Indigenous peoples’ rights in a country, the government of that country tends to not present the required information or simply to overlook its obligation to report to the ILO, which makes it difficult to identify clearly what is happening in the country.

Therefore, to complement this aspect of the study, I have used another source of information. This second source consists of reports prepared by the special rapporteurs on Indigenous peoples’ rights. This position was created in 2001 by the UN Commission on Human Rights and is charged with presenting annual reports on Indigenous peoples’ rights as well as visiting the countries involved, communicating information about the human rights situation, presenting recommendations, and carrying out monitoring activities. At the time of writing, there have been three rapporteurs: Rodolfo Stavenhagen (2001–2008), James Anaya (2008–2014), and Victoria Tauli-Corpuz (2014–2020). This position allows us to understand the critical human rights situations of Indigenous peoples in greater detail. On many occasions, the rapporteurs themselves chose to visit precisely those countries identified in the first source as having governments that no longer respond to the ILO Commission.

Finally, the third source consulted here consists of the documents published by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I/A Court H.R.). Both institutions belong to the Organization of American States (OAS). While the first two sources provide relevant information in summary form, allowing diverse problems to be addressed, this third source makes it possible to examine concrete cases of non-compliance in greater detail. The IACHR documents I have used include admissibility reports and merit reports, as well as both the precautionary measures that describe the specific complaints examined by the commission itself and thematic and country reports. Of the documents produced by the I/A Court H.R., I have consulted the sentences in cases of alleged violations of Indigenous peoples’ rights, especially those related to lands in the countries under study. I have reviewed the closed cases up to 2018 and their corresponding case summaries.

The sources mentioned above make it possible to remain up to date on relevant cases of Indigenous rights violations based on the international standard. Though governments often declare that they are making every effort to fulfill their international obligations, pointing to legislation, specific programs, dialogues and workshops organized with Indigenous peoples, the words of these governments do not ensure the effect they suggest. In this regard, the sources mentioned above allow us to verify those situations that show non-compliance by such governments. The index developed in this study can therefore measure the gaps that exist between legalities and their practices in qualitative terms.

Text analysis

The next four stages of this study include the procedure for analyzing the documents.³ In the first stage, I examined all the documents for each country.⁴ The objective of this stage was to explore the key points to distinguish situations of severe non-compliance from other relatively mild situations. It was also useful for getting a sense of what types of land-related issues have been identified as problematic for the countries under study. Therefore, I have taken notes on each document and marked all the relevant texts. At the same time, I consulted other sources such as audio and video recordings of the IACHR hearings on the issue of Indigenous peoples’ rights and reviewed the news items and blogs published by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that report on relevant cases. While these sources of additional information were not used as direct sources for examination, they help to understand the cases described in the documents from multiple angles.

In the second stage, I created a text analysis guide based on the knowledge obtained in the first stage as well as on the fundamental concepts expressed in the second part of Convention 169, which deals with land (arts. 13–19). I have thus established four points of comparison to re-examine the documents:

1. Collective property titles for Indigenous peoples (arts. 13, 14-1, 14-2).⁵
2. Territorial security against invaders (arts. 14-2, 14-3, 18).⁶
3. Territorial security against evictions and displacement (arts. 14-2, 16).⁷
4. Consultation about natural resources in the lands occupied by Indigenous peoples (art. 15).⁸

I then prepared a provisional rating scale for each point to serve as a guideline, which was then adjusted based on the review of the texts in the next stage.

In the third stage, I carried out lexical searches for points 2 to 4 and identified all the texts that included the most-used words or codes for each point.⁹ I then used the results of the searches to check the original documents to confirm their relevance for the points of comparison under study. Where confirmed, I applied codes to the segments to then analyze them thoroughly.

I organized the coded segments by country and time period in an Excel document and analyzed them again to create summaries for both categories (segments and countries). For point of comparison 1, due to the complexity of the information related to progress in land titling, I evaluated the situations quantitatively, which I describe in detail in the following section.

In the fourth and final stage, as mentioned above, I adjusted the provisional rating scale based on the results of my re-examination of the texts. This new scale serves as the criterion for measuring the implementation gap in qualitative terms.

Analysis

Territory with collective property title

The first criterion is related to the implementation of the “rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy” (ILO Convention 169, art. 14-1). Point 2 of the same article refers to the governments’ obligation to “identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy.” In my review of the documents, I did not find a shared criterion for evaluating the state of implementation of these aspects, as there are different presentations of the number of titles granted, the size of the area titled, and the number of beneficiaries — counting beneficiaries as individuals in some countries and as communities in others.

Governments tend to show the numbers that offer the most successful impressions. However, special care is needed to interpret such numbers when comparing countries with large degrees of geographic and demographic diversity. The following is an imaginary example: it is not easy to determine which of two countries is in a more favourable situation for its Indigenous peoples if we compare country X, with an area of 120 million hectares, 50% of which is titled for Indigenous peoples, who represent 30% of the national population of 40 million inhabitants, with country Y, which has an area of 40 million hectares, of which 2.5% is titled for Indigenous peoples, who represent 2% of the total population of six million inhabitants.

As a result, I decided to calculate the area per person of collectively and/or individually titled lands for Indigenous peoples and peasants, including peoples of African descent in some cases.¹⁰ Although it is uncommon to consider the amount of land that corresponds to each individual in a collective that holds a single property title, it works well for comparing different countries. The calculation helps us to understand relative magnitude in the implementation of the right to property and land ownership. In the case of the example above, the amount of titled land that corresponds to an Indigenous person in country X is 5 hectares, while in country Y it is 8.3 hectares.

Importantly, this study does not aim to propose a standard amount of land per person that would be sufficient for Indigenous peoples; rather, it aims to identify a point of reference tied to the current reality in Latin America using the most recent available data.

Furthermore, I am conscious of the cultural and historical diversity between different Indigenous groups. Intuitively, ethnic groups whose livelihoods depend on hunting and gathering, who live in voluntary isolation and move from place to place depending on nature’s offerings, should have a larger territory than other ethnic groups who always live in a certain place and depend on traditional family agriculture. Nonetheless, it is not as simple as applying different criteria based on characteristics apparently linked to land use. We must also consider the different meanings of these characteristics for each group, including spiritual and sacred uses. Similarly, there are groups that were originally hunters yet have been forced to become precarious workers, no longer occupying the land they previously used due to having modified their habits.

Calculating the area per person of lands titled as collective property for Indigenous peoples and peasants shows the distribution for the ten countries in the database. These countries are, in fact, the countries in Latin America that constitute a legally advanced group in terms of the pursuit of Indigenous self-determination. The average area corresponding to an Indigenous person in this set of countries is 6 hectares, with a deviation of 4.1 hectares. This number has been used to calculate the Z scores that indicate where a country is situated in the distribution of all countries.

As there is no overall ideal amount of land for an Indigenous person, I have established an anchor in the data extracted from the countries under study. Based on these previously defined scores, I established Z ± 0.5 as the anchor and chose two concrete area measures to differentiate the levels of implementation of the right to land titling. To distinguish the most advanced group from the middle group, I used the area measure for Paraguay, which is 8.2 hectares per person, with a Z score of 0.53. As this is the Z score closest to the anchor, the applicable number is 8.0 hectares per person. Similarly, to choose a number that separates the intermediate level from a low level, I looked for the Z score closest to −0.5, which is the case of Venezuela, with a Z score of −0.48 and an estimated area of 4.1 hectares per person. Thus, the applicable number in this case is 4.0 hectares per person. Finally, based on this process, I created the criteria and assigned them gap scores as described below.

Territory with collective property title: Gap scores

1. Indigenous land area with property title per person greater than 8.0 hectares. --------------------------------------------- 0
2. Indigenous land area with property title per person between 4.0 and 8.0 hectares. ---------------------------------------- 0.5
3. Indigenous land area with property title per person less than 4.0 hectares. --------------------------------------------------- 1

Table 2.2 shows the data used and the final scores. I have thus differentiated three groups with different levels of progress in implementing the right to lands and territories in terms of our first point of comparison: collective property titles for Indigenous peoples. The first group, whose implementation gap is the lowest with a score of 0, includes Colombia (14.9 ha), Bolivia (10.8 ha) and Paraguay (8.2 ha). Despite the outlying figure for Colombia, it is important to consider, as a safeguard, that a sizable portion of the titled lands are probably occupied in reality by non-indigenous agents.

Another important point to take into account to better understand these figures is related to Paraguay. According to official country reports, an estimated 34.5 percent of its titled lands correspond to deforested areas (Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos [DGEEC], 2016, p. 32). This means that 333,023 hectares of forest — the original habitat of the country’s Indigenous peoples — have been lost. The net figure of titled and, in practice, habitable lands is thus 5.7 hectares, which would put the country in the intermediate group. However, the aspect under evaluation here is strictly the size of lands already officially recognized with property titles — not their use in practice. I explore this situation in greater detail in the next section.

The second group, with a score of 0.5, includes Nicaragua (7.2 ha), Ecuador (4.7 ha), Peru (4.3 ha), Panama (4.1 ha) and Venezuela (4.1 ha). For the case of Nicaragua, its relatively large area reflects the progress it has made in the titling process in twenty-three territories in the North Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region, the South Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region, and the special area of Alto Wangki-Bocay (Ministerio del Ambiente y de los Recursos Naturales [MARENA], 2017, p. 66). If it had also met the territorial demands of the Indigenous peoples in the Pacific, Central, and Northern regions (Procuraduría General de la República, Proyecto de Ordenamiento de la Propiedad [PRODEP], 2013, p. 126), Nicaragua would likely have been included in the first group.

The final group, with a score of 1, has the largest implementation gap and includes Guatemala (0.3 ha) and Mexico (1.9 ha). Guatemala’s starkly low number is worthy of note. Even though the country’s constitution sets forth the right to collective ownership by Indigenous peoples (arts. 67–68), no appropriate mechanisms have been developed to date to resolve the land issue.

Territorial security against invaders

The second and third points of comparison address territorial security. The second half of point 2 in article 14 (C169) indicates the obligation of governments to “guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession.” To reflect this primordial aspect of the right to land, I use here the term territorial security instead of effective protection; the two terms mean the same thing, but with different perspectives. As the vast majority of documented situations lack government-provided territorial protection, it makes more sense to focus our attention on the Indigenous subject to describe this dimension.

I have thus created two categories related to possible threats to territorial security. The first is for invasion, and the second is for evictions and/or forced displacements. Based on my review of documents in the first stage of this analysis, I have identified these as the main territorial problems that occur frequently in all the countries used to develop the criteria.

In cases of invasion, the agents are mainly non-Indigenous settlers or peasants who may also be loggers, ranchers, miners, or soybean farmers, as well as other Indigenous groups. For instances of eviction or forced displacement, the agents are landowners, companies, government authorities and/or armed criminal groups.

I distinguish between these two types of risk because their impact on territorial security is different. While an invasion makes the traditional lives of Indigenous peoples difficult over the long term, evictions and forced displacements expropriate the right to these lands either immediately or over the relatively short term. It is therefore more appropriate to consider incidents of forced displacement as embodying a larger gap between the right to land and the implementation of this right, and as such, these incidents should be assigned a higher score than other criteria.

To determine the scores for territorial security in cases of invasion, I reviewed the measures taken by the relevant governments. The existence of invaders has been recorded in all cases except for Guatemala. This is because Indigenous peoples in Guatemala lack legal certainty with respect to their right to land, which, in turn, affects this fundamental aspect. During the internal armed conflict in Guatemala between 1960 and 1996, most Indigenous peoples were forcibly displaced. After the peace accords, some returned to their lands of origin and others went to new places to pursue a life free of violence. However, when the areas where they lived were declared a natural protected area, the Indigenous inhabitants were accused of being invaders (CIDH, 2017a, par. 217). Given this context, though invaders have not been noted in the lands belonging to Indigenous peoples in Guatemala, I consider the country deserving of the highest score for a gap in this criterion.

To compare the rest of the countries that do note the existence of invaders, I have identified differences in how the various governments reacted to situations in which Indigenous families or communities suffered an invasion of their lands. As no government effectively protects the right to land in advance of an invasion, it seems convincing to assess their performance after the event. The criteria and their scores are shown below.

Similarly, to evaluate the effectiveness of the measures taken by different governments — that is, to determine if a measure was apparently insufficient (criterion b, score of 0.5) or insignificant (criterion c, score of 1), I checked both the characteristics of the measures themselves as well as the situations that developed after steps were taken.

Territorial security against invaders: Gap scores

1. When situations of territorial invasion are found, the government takes effective measures to resolve the problem. ------- 0
2. When situations of territorial invasion are found, the government takes apparently insufficient measures to resolve the problem. ------------------------------------------------------- 0.5
3. When situations of territorial invasion are found, the government does not take any measures or takes apparently insignificant measures. ----------------------------------------- 1

Table 2.3 shows a summary of the situations related to territorial security against invaders and the measures and/or responses by governments. Only Bolivia and Panama obtained a score of 0.5 in this criterion.

In the Bolivian case, the database includes six segments extracted from two documents: the ILO Direct Request (CEACR) adopted at the 1994 International Labour Conference (par. 21) and the report of the Special Rapporteur on the Mission to Bolivia (Stavenhagen, 2009, pars. 33, 40, 46, 48, 49, 53). The first source provides information about the existence of invaders and the measure taken by the government with supreme decree number 23107 of 9 April 1992, which created the Indigenous Forest Guard, constituted by Indigenous peoples themselves. This Guard oversaw the monitoring and protection of their territories, with sufficient power to impose sanctions on those who broke the law (CEACR, 1994, par. 21).

However, the second source shows that threats to Indigenous lands persisted. The Rapporteur, who visited Bolivia from 25 November to 7 December 2007, reported that in the lowlands there was pressure on and an invasion of Peasant Native Indigenous Territories (TIOC, Territorios Indígenas Originarios Campesinos, first called Native Community Lands (Tierras Comunitarias de Origen, TCO)) by Indigenous settlers and peasants from other regions in the country, creating situations with high levels of conflict (CEACR, 1994, par. 33).

Hydrocarbon extraction activities contributed to the invasion and appropriation of Indigenous lands in Bolivia’s Amazon and Chaco regions (CEACR, 1994, par. 40). With respect to the most vulnerable peoples, the Rapporteur described the situation of the Yuqui people with special attention. The Yuqui were first contacted in 1959, and in the 1980s they were moved to the Bia Recuaté community where they were given a Yuqui TIOC. Nonetheless, this population of 200–230 people were subject to constant pressure on their land from settlers, other Indigenous communities, and loggers (CEACR, 1994, par. 46). As a result, the government’s measure to protect the life of the Yuqui people, granting them a TIOC, was not sufficient to halt the threat of an invasion of their territory.

In this context, in April 2007, the country’s Ministry of Rural Development, Agriculture, and the Environment implemented a policy to defend vulnerable peoples, constituting an Interministerial Commission on highly vulnerable Indigenous peoples. This commission developed an emergency plan to serve the Yuqui people, and the Vice-Ministry of Lands prioritized work with the Yuqui, Araona, Ayoreo and Uru Chipaya peoples (CEACR, 1994, par. 48).

In 2006, with the same intention of protecting the most vulnerable peoples, the Bolivian government approved the declaration of an “intangible and integral protection zone of absolute reserve” inside the Madidi national park, which coincided with the traditional territory of the Toromona people, who live in isolation (CEACR, 1994, par. 49). With the same aim, in December 2007 the government granted the Guaraní people of Chuquisaca (Huacareta, Ingle, Machareti and Muyupampa communities) 180,000 hectares of land under the land reform’s Law of Community Renewal (CEACR, 1994, par. 53). Nonetheless, and because it has not been possible to confirm a reduction in territorial pressure, the case of Bolivia was given a score of 0.5.

The other case with a score of 0.5 is Panama. Fourteen segments in seven documents were consulted for this case: six ILO Direct Requests (CEACR, 1989, pars. 12, 13; 1992, par. 12; 1996, par. 8; 2003, par. 11; 2005, pars. 20–21; 2010, arts. 11–14; 2016, art. 13) and one report by the Special Rapporteur (Anaya, 2014, pars. 8, 9, 30, 34–36), as well as two complete documents from the IACHR (13 November 2012) and the I/A Court H.R. (14 October 2014).

To summarize the case, Indigenous peoples in the Kuna region of Madungandí and the Emberá people of Bayano were invaded by other settlers in the region. The source of the problem was a dam construction project in the area. After moving the inhabitants, the government did not fulfill its promise to delineate and title their new lands, thereby allowing the settlers to invade and exploit the forest in a systematic fashion. More than three decades later, thanks to diverse complaints by the population, the case made it to the I/A Court H.R. in 2014. Although the government did legislate decrees during this period to create the Kuna de Madungandí comarca (Indigenous territory) (Law no. 24, 1996), to title land in favor of peoples outside their comarca (Law no. 72, 2008), and to appoint township authorities in the Kuna de Madungandí comarca (Law no. 247, 2008), the Special Rapporteur’s report noted that there were persistent concerns among the Indigenous communities both within and outside the comarcas due to the presence of third parties (Anaya, 2014, par. 30).

Based on this situation and on a CEACR Direct Request indicating, following a government report, in 2012, the comarca district carried out an eviction of thirty peasants who were occupying land in the area of the Botes river and the Piragua river (CEACR, 2016, art. 13), the Panamanian case has been granted a score of 0.5, as the government did adopt concrete measures, though they proved to be insufficient.

For the cases given a score of 1, I cannot explore the results for each country in depth, but it is worth reiterating the importance of the efficacy of the measures governments take to address complaints. Colombia offers an example of a symbolic type of government response. According to the CEACR (2009), which cites a text from the Workers’ Trade Union Confederation for the Oil Industry (USO) received by the ILO in 2008, the Chidima reserve was created in 2001 with three discontinuous lots, which facilitated the invasion of the third lot by settlers. The settlers arrived with plowing machinery and burned the grass, threatening to kill the Indigenous inhabitants. As a result, the Katío people have asked for the three lots to be joined in a single reserve. The government has promised that this would be done, yet it ultimately was not, and in the end the government responded with a letter that clearly demonstrates its position, exactly as the USO text denounces:

The USO attaches a letter from the Colombian Institute of Rural Development (INCODER), stating that ‘there is no budget for regularization for 2006’. The USO reports that when the indigenous people sought protection against such invasion, INCODER replied that once a title has been issued for the reservation, it would be up to the indigenous communities to prevent the territory from being invaded. (CEACR, 2009)

For other cases with a score of 1, as with Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela, I have examined the qualitative characteristics of events. What these cases have in common is a lack of effective measures for resolving conflicts and threats created by the presence of invaders in indigenous territory.

Territorial security against evictions and forced displacements

The practices of eviction and forced displacement have been treated with the same criteria. Forced eviction, according to the UN’s definition, is the “removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy” (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1997, general comment No. 7). The agents of this action have the clear objective of removing people from these lands. For forced displacements, the actions can be more complex: intimidation, theft, kidnapping, murder, massacre or mass fumigation. Nonetheless, both methods have almost identical effects upon people, forcing individuals, families and/or communities to abandon their land.

The ownership status of a territory is not in question here, but rather the fact that there are evictions and/or forced displacements documented in the sources. Therefore, there may be cases in which Indigenous communities do not have territorial rights to the lands they have inhabited de facto for years, and where, for this very reason, they have been evicted for the crime of usurpation, as was the case in both Guatemala and Ecuador. In Ecuador, while preserving their full right to continue inhabiting the land, Indigenous communities were evicted from areas where concessions were granted inside their territory. Both Guatemala and Ecuador are included in this same category.

To develop the criteria and scoring for evaluating situations of territorial security against evictions and displacements, I have used the frequency of incidents documented in the database. Though the numbers documented are often only partial, which does not allow us to fully understand the overall situation, there is a clear divergence in the number of incidents.

Therefore, even taking into account the high level of diversity between the populations under study and the different degrees of margin of error in the information, I consider it to be a useful basis for the purposes of comparison. I have defined the criteria as described below, and the concrete numbers mentioned in the criteria have been extracted from the database.

Territorial security against evictions and displacements: Gap scores

1. No cases of forced eviction/displacement. --------------------- 0
2. Less than ten cases of forced eviction/displacement in the period between 1991 and 2019. ------------------------------------ 0.5
3. Between ten and forty cases of eviction/displacement in the period between 1991 and 2019. --------------------------------- 1
4. Forty-one or more cases of eviction/displacement in the period between 1991 and 2019. -------------------------------------- 2

Before examining the summaries, I wish to note that some of the cases of invasion described in the previous section increased the extent of violence in the region, as was the case in Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru. Though not all invasions were carried out in the same way, when exacerbated violence — which contributes to forced displacement — is noted to be present, invasions are also considered forced displacement. This allows a distinction to be made between an invasion that does not lead to forced displacement and an invasion that does meet this more violent criterion, and the latter cases are thus considered in both categories.

The exception applied to the case of Venezuela also requires further explanation. The country has been facing a serious economic, social, and political crisis since the mid-2010s, presenting a clear situation of forced migration. As a result, and despite the documents and texts not providing any evidence of evictions and/or displacements of Indigenous peoples in the country, the criterion for Venezuela is as follows: d) there are mass evictions and/or displacements. The summaries and their corresponding scores are presented in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4 shows the summary of results with respect to the gap in territorial security against invasions and displacement. Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama and Peru are in the group with the smallest gap (score of 0.5). There have been evictions and/or forced displacements in all these countries, though fewer than those found in the other two groups.

Bolivia, for example, has had cases of eviction by both landowners and government authorities, the latter of which took place in the context of the land title regularization process, though the frequency of such evictions cannot be determined (CIDH, 2007, par. 238). Similarly, though there is scarce information, there was an increase in evictions to benefit mining and logging concessions in the Bolivian Chaco (CIDH, 2009, pars. 164–165). As the documents do not reveal the number of incidents, I have granted this case a score of 0.5, which implies less than ten such events. Of course, there may have been more than ten, but what is essential for this analysis is the fact that specific cases have been noted and recorded in the documents, thus when the frequency cannot be specifically determined, I have chosen to apply the lower score.

Let us now turn to the other cases in this group. In Ecuador, there were four evictions and three displacements caused by mining megaprojects (Tauli-Corpuz, 2019, pars. 27–29) and one displacement due to the military settlement on the northern border (Tauli-Corpuz, 2019, par. 70). In Panama, four evictions affected the Naso inhabitants in the San San and San San Druy communities in 2009. In this case, the government supported the position of the third party, a local ranching company, ignoring the communities’ demands to create a comarca (Anaya, 2009a, pars. 342–346; Anaya, 2010, pars. 304–305).

Among this group, Peru is the only country where there are no records of evictions in the sense of removing Indigenous peoples from the homes or lands they occupy.¹¹ Furthermore, there was only one case of forced displacement in the context of an exacerbated invasion by non-Indigenous settlers and their ongoing acts of harassment against the native community of Nueva Austria del Sira. Of the twenty-three families in the community, only fourteen families remained in the area by the time the IACHR received the request for precautionary measures in 2019 (IACHR, 6 November 2019, par. 9).

In the intermediate group (score of 1), we have Mexico, Nicaragua and Paraguay. In Mexico, the primary agents of eviction and displacement are landowners, companies, other Indigenous communities fighting for the same territory and organized criminal groups. Evictions and displacements have been recorded in the states of Chiapas, Chihuahua, Guerrero, Campeche, Oaxaca, Sonora, Sinaloa and Veracruz (Stavenhagen, 2003a, par. 26; Tripartite Committee-ILO [ILO-CT], 2004, par. 113; Anaya, 2009a, pars. 247–248; Anaya, 2010, pars. 277–281; Tauli-Corpuz, 2018a, pp. 21, 23, 24, 26, 29, 30).

In the case of Nicaragua, forced displacements have occurred as a result of the land dispute between Indigenous communities and settlers in the North Caribbean Coast. As a result, there have been multiple acts of violence, including the displacement of members of at least twelve local communities.¹² In a population of 10,800 people in the Indigenous territories, at least 4,159 people have been forced to leave their homes (IACHR, 8 August 2016, 8-B-iv).¹³

With respect to Paraguay, the CEACR Request notes that according to a report sent by the government,

cases of eviction or forced relocation of indigenous communities by landowners, soya farmers and other farmers often remain pending before the judicial authorities for several years and that in 2008 and 2009 INDI [Paraguayan Institute of Indigenous Affairs (Instituto Paraguayo del Indígena)] took legal action on more than ten occasions to secure protective measures. (CEACR, 2010, arts. 16, 17, 18)

Though we do not know the details of each eviction and displacement, we can confirm that they surpass the established criterion in number.

In the final group, with the highest score (2), we have Colombia, Guatemala and Venezuela, with the latter constituting an exception due to the phenomenon of forced migration. In Colombia, the forced displacements are incomparably harsh and are mainly caused by constant armed clashes in Indigenous territories. According to the IACHR report, there were forty-one events in 2012 alone, and the most affected peoples were the Emberá (4,860), the Nasa (4,674), the Awá (1,725), the Wounaan (237) and the Jiw (100) (IACHR, 2013, par. 798).

In Guatemala, the CEACR notes “a trend of evictions by court order” (CEACR, 2019, art. 14, par. 4). The UN Special Rapporteur visited Guatemala and reported that, on many occasions, the evictions are ordered by the Public Ministry due to the crime of aggravated usurpation, a legal concept adopted in 1996 that does not allow the communities to prove their rights to the occupied lands (Tauli-Corpuz, 2018b, par. 46). 45 evictions were recorded in 2018, despite the government’s commitment to apply international norms (Tauli-Corpuz, 2018b, par. 49).

The right to be consulted about natural resources in traditionally occupied land

With respect to the right to be consulted about the natural resources that exist in the lands occupied by Indigenous peoples, article 15 of Convention 169 sets forth the government obligation to establish appropriate procedures for consulting Indigenous peoples “before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands” (art. 15-2). This is one of the most controversial points related to territorial autonomy.

I have chosen to focus on aspects of actual implementation and their consequences instead of on processes of legislation and regulation. While there is certainly variation in terms of legislative progress in the region, there are cases where even when there are significant laws in place, they are not put into practice and, hence, do not have significant effects.

Therefore, following my first review of the texts, I identified the criteria described below. While all the countries under study present problematic features with regard to the right to consultation, it was essential to determine where to draw the line separating severely deficient countries from those less deficient. I have thus defined criterion b) as shown below.

The right to be consulted about natural resources: Gap score

1. Consultations are carried out and no complaints have been recorded about inadequate practices. ---------------------- 0
2. There has been at least one consultation that resulted in an agreement. ------------------------------------------------- 0.5
3. There have only been cases of omission and/or inadequate consultation processes. ------------------------------------- 1

The ideal and correct terms for point b), however, should be that there has been at least one consultation carried out using an appropriate procedure. This entails a consultation that satisfies the qualities outlined by the I/A Court H.R. in the 2012 Sarayaku vs. Ecuador case; namely, that the consultation be “prior,” in “good faith,” “culturally appropriate and accessible,” include an “environmental impact assessment,” have “the purpose of reaching an agreement” and inform about the possible risks of the proposed project (27 June 2012, pp. 55–66). Yet it is impossible to verify if a consultation has been carried out in compliance with all these requirements using only the documents examined in this study. As a result, I sought an alternative and examined which of these aspects could be confirmed in the available texts, finding that two of them — prior consultation and reaching an agreement — met this condition.

The first aspect was immediately ruled out, as the only project where prior consultation was carried out according to the government (and for which no complaints were found in the database) was found in an external source to not have in fact been prior. As the document (a Direct Request) includes the concrete name of the case — the hydroelectric project Las Cruces in the state of Nayarit in Mexico (CEACR, 2014) — additional information was easy to collect, and online searches yielded several complaints. One such complaint is a letter written by the lawyer for the Inter-American Association for Environmental Defense addressed to the social communication manager of the Federal Electricity Commission (Moguel, 2015, pp. 2–3). The letter clearly alleges that the process was not prior. Reaching an agreement, then, became the only viable criterion.

Table 2.5 shows the summaries. Colombia and Peru are the only two countries with a score of 0.5, as they have documented cases of consultations that managed to reach agreements. All the other countries have only complaints about the lack of consultation or inadequate consultations that lacked one or all the qualities described above.

Though Colombia and Peru have received numerous similar complaints, there are also references that document progress in consultation processes in these two countries. This is particularly relevant in the case of Colombia, as the texts include a positive comment made in this regard by an external expert and not only by the government itself. Of the eighteen documents about consultations in Colombia studied here, there is one comment by the Special Rapporteur, Stavenhagen (2004), who visited the country, that notes:

The communities maintain that the mechanism does not operate in the same way in all parts of the country. In the indigenous territories of Antioquia, the Special Rapporteur was told that mining and other projects were launched without prior consultation or the consent of the indigenous communities. On the other hand, the indigenous peoples of the Sierra Nevada, the Wayuu people in Guajira and the Awa in Nariño report that they have made some headway with consultation processes. (par. 55) [emphasis added]

In addition to this reference, there are two segments that reflect circumstances of relevance for this country. First, the CEACR Direct Request reports that for the mining project Mandé Norte, a national megaproject in the departments of Antioquia and Chocó, the Colombian government indicated that the inhabitants of the Chidima reserve were consulted in 2013, and as a result, the route of the road to be constructed as part of the project was changed (CEACR, 2016, art. 15).

This report does not indicate if all affected inhabitants agreed with this change; surely some of them rejected the construction of the highway or the project itself entirely. However, the information in the report does show that for these consultations to take place in 2013, the Constitutional Court’s sentence T-769 of 2009 was crucial, confirming the lack of prior consultation and the existence of attempts by the mining company to impose the project. This sentence ordered that the project’s exploration and exploitation activities be suspended and requested that prior consultation be repeated with free, prior, and informed consent in all communities that might be affected by the project. This constituted a major legal precedent in the country.

A CEACR Observation also shows that the government reported a total of 4,891 consultation processes with ethnic communities between 2003 and 2015, 4,198 of which ended with agreements (CEACR, 2016, art. 15). In comparison, the information about consultations agreed to in Peru shows twenty-two such processes carried out between 2011 and 2017 (CEACR, 2018, art. 6, par. 2), highlighting the number of agreements and possible degree of commitment by authorities in Colombia.

Results

Applying the four criteria discussed above shows the implementation gaps in rights to land and territory in the ten countries analyzed here (see Figure 2.1).

First, Guatemala stands out with the largest gaps in all areas, obtaining a final score of 5.0. It is followed by Venezuela, with a score of 4.5. In these countries, Indigenous peoples are severely unprotected in terms of their rights to their land, which also affects other, more fundamental, rights, such as the right to life.

The case of Mexico comes next (4.0), followed by Colombia and Nicaragua, which share a score of 3.5. Together, these three countries all share the problems of eviction and forced displacement. In Mexico and Colombia, the violence caused by armed criminal groups surpasses the governments’ capacity to maintain citizen safety, and in Nicaragua, the government ignores its responsibility to stop the aggressive acts carried out by settlers in Indigenous territories.

Paraguay and Ecuador follow these countries, with a score of 3.0. The difference between the two lies in how much progress they have made in titling and in the number of evictions and forced displacements. While Paraguay has seen greater progress in terms of land titling for Indigenous peoples, it turns out to have the same gap as Ecuador due to its inability to guarantee security from invaders, evictions and forced displacement.

With a score of 2.5, Peru and Panama are the next two countries. They differ from one another in terms of security against invaders and how they handle consultations. While Panama made several attempts, though with setbacks, to stop invasions by settlers in Indigenous territories, Peru did not help its native inhabitants who needed territorial protection. They received the same score, though, because the government of Peru attempted to make advances with consultation processes, while the government of Panama has a more reticent policy in this regard.

Finally, Bolivia comes through with the lowest gap (2.0). It has made progress in land titling and has distributed relatively more land to Indigenous peoples than the other countries analyzed here. Nonetheless, the lack of citizen consultations persists, as is the case in the vast majority of the countries examined.

Conclusion

All the countries studied here present implementation gaps; no country is perfect. However, there is variety in the magnitude of these gaps, as this study shows. The larger the gap, the lower the possibility of safeguarding other legally recognized rights, such as the right to life and the right to self-determination.

Now that the gaps in terms of the implementation of land rights is clearer, the next steps are 1) to explore the necessary and sufficient conditions that have influenced the results obtained in this study; and 2) to investigate the four other operational features that Bennagen proposed for evaluating concrete situations of Indigenous autonomy (Bennagen, 1992, p. 72).

For the first step, it is essential to distinguish between two types of factors to carry out the fsQCA in two phases: remote factors and proximate factors (Schneider and Wagemann, 2006). Remote factors are relatively stable over time; their distance from current results is large in terms of both time and space. As a result, they are beyond the conscious influence of the actors involved, thus we can consider historical and/or structural contexts to be remote factors.

For the cases analyzed in this study, remote factors may be 1) the existence of territorial institutions for Indigenous peoples prior to the 1990s (for example, reserves in Colombia, comarcas in Panama, as well as autonomous regions in Nicaragua); and 2) the lack of internal armed conflict (unlike in Colombia, Guatemala and Nicaragua). While the existence of a territorial institution historically recognized by Indigenous peoples would strengthen the process of implementing the right to lands and territories, the repercussions or perpetuation of internal conflict may impede this process.

Proximate factors, in contrast, change over time and are vulnerable to changes made by actors, thus they are closer to the results in terms of time and space. In the Latin American context, these factors include 1) a high degree of democracy; 2) a lack of organized criminal groups; 3) a high level of political representation in the national congress (Stavenhagen, 2006, par. 84); and 4) the existence of political will represented by financial resources allocated to the regularization of Indigenous lands and territories (Aylwin, 2002, p. 74).

Not included here, for example, is the neo-extractivist development policy that has clearly affected the implementation of land policy for Indigenous populations (Tockman and Cameron, 2014), as all the cases studied share this tendency and it would be difficult to find variation within the group in this regard. Each of these factors requires extensive, in-depth analysis and will thus be examined in greater detail in the next phase of this research.

I hope that this attempt to take stock of the situation can serve as a point of departure in the ongoing pursuit of effective strategies that can reduce the region’s implementation gaps.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for the helpful comments I received from Liisa North and Jeffery Webber on an earlier version of this article in the discussion panel on “Indigenous and Peasant Autonomy in Latin America: Agency, Governance, and Land Rights” (held at York University, 10 February 2020). I am also grateful to my esteemed co-editors for their valuable suggestions. Of course, any errors are my responsibility. This article was made possible by a grant from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS)-KAKENHI, a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists-B, JP17K13678; Fund for the Promotion of Joint International Research Grant JP19KK0325.

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Annex 1

Annex 2
References cited in tables 2 to 5

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