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Deterrence in the 21st century: Afterword

Deterrence in the 21st century
Afterword
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table of contents
  1. Contents
  2. Foreword
  3. Preface
    1. Introduction
  4. Section I Deterrence as an Evolving Concept
    1. 1 Deterrence Is Always about Information: A New Framework for Understanding
    2. 2 Nuclear Crisis Management for the Information Age
    3. 3 Deterrence by De-legitimization in the Information Environment: Concept, Theory, and Practice
  5. Section II Wider Strategic Context and Experiences
    1. 4 Understanding Russia’s Approaches to Information Warfare
    2. 5 The Evolution of China’s Information Exploitation of COVID-19
    3. 6 Deterrence in the Gaza Conflict: Hamas Case Study Analysis
    4. 7 Resilience as a Framework for Deterrence in the Information Age: Lessons Learned from Israel about Information and Influence Operations
  6. Section III Canada’s Context
    1. 8 Deterrence and Strategic Disinformation: An Overview of Canada’s Responses
    2. 9 Exit, Voice, or Loyalty? Functional Engagement as Cyber Strategy for Middle Power Statecraft
  7. Section IV Emerging Tools and Approaches
    1. 10 Digital Tribalism and Ontological Insecurity: Manipulating Identities in the Information Environment
    2. 11 Deterrence for Online Radicalization and Recruitment in the Twenty-First Century
    3. 12 Assessing Influence in Target Audiences that Won’t Say or Don’t Know How Much They Have Been Influenced
    4. Conclusion
    5. Afterword
    6. Postface
  8. List of Abbreviations
  9. About the Authors
  10. Index

Afterword

What does the future hold for us as it relates to deterrence and disinformation? Surely not clarity and certainty. The world shall continue to be VUCA (volatile, uncertain, chaotic, and ambiguous) as it has always been since humans have started to organize themselves in social groups. One could argue that the world is VUCA because it describes the human condition, i.e., our capacity and need to “gossip” as the most social animal on earth, as well as our predispositions to perceive threats coming from others we don’t necessarily know or understand. I’m sure that in the year 166, Marcus Aurelius would have found the world very VUCA while battling a pandemic, insurgencies, constant wars, and instability on the borders of the Roman Empire. The world is VUCA because we can’t predict the future nor control or predict human behaviour.

One could think that highly sophisticated modern communication systems could dissipate these frictions and ambiguities. As many experts rightly pointed out, the advances in communication technologies and social media have added additional layers of complexity to human interactions where anyone can reach wide audiences instantaneously without having the correct information at the source. In other words, anything goes, and it goes fast. In the international security environment and international relations disciplines we should therefore expect a real challenge in terms of deterring threats and disinformation. And this will not go away anytime soon.

I could offer that framing disinformation in the context of others (adversaries, competitors, and allies) may be useful in the sense that disinformation to us may represent the reality or the truth for others. In my view, this scenario is even more dangerous, as fighting deeply engrained beliefs is more complex than merely associating disinformation with spreading lies. As such, we could argue that the invasion of Ukraine has been in the works for many years as the West consistently ignored Putin’s sense of threat coming from a NATO on its continued expansion course to the East since 1999. And the same could be said for China. To qualify Russia’s action as barbaric and unnecessary in the twenty-first century is not helpful. In a VUCA world, we should expect the unexpected. Although we know we have no ill intent or plans to threaten Russia and China, these state leaders feel threatened and their rhetoric, behaviours, and information campaigns reflect just that.

Although deterrence consists in a wide range and combination of different scalable means, maybe it starts with establishing trust, one conversation at a time in the back rooms of diplomacy walking in with our eyes wide open. Establishing trust could mean taking seriously others’ sense of feeling threatened. Simply put, maybe deterrence starts by proactively treating our adversaries, competitors, and allies with respect. Especially when we disagree. We should not underestimate the disarming long-term effects of honesty, transparency, and coherent comprehensive approaches.

Lieutenant-General Jennie Carignan,

Chief of Professional Conduct and Culture

7 June 2022

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Deterrence in the 21st Century
© 2024 Eric Ouellet, Madeleine D’Agata, and Keith Stewart
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