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The Multiverse: Index

The Multiverse
Index
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Notes

table of contents
  1. Half Title Page
  2. Series Page
  3. Title Page
  4. Copyright
  5. Dedication
  6. Contents
  7. Annotated Contents
  8. Preface
  9. 1 Introduction
    1. 1. The Plan: Three Multiverse Proposals
    2. 2. What Do I Believe?
    3. 3. What Should You Believe?
    4. 4. What Would You Risk? Confidence vs. Caution
    5. 5. Beware the Beguiling Power of Words
    6. 6. Can We Be Sure That We Are in the Same Universe?
    7. 7. Notes and Further Reading
  10. 2 Physics and Philosophy from 1600 to 1900
    1. 1. The Tradition of Natural Philosophy
    2. 2. The Mechanical Philosophy
    3. 3. Newton’s Theory of Gravity: Unbelievable?
    4. 4. Optimism about Understanding Nature: “We Will Soon Deduce the Effect from the Cause”
    5. 5. Lowering Our Sights: Hume
    6. 6. Newton Again
    7. 7. Logic in the Doldrums—and Its Revival
    8. 8. Houses Built on Sand—and How to Repair Them
    9. 9. Notes and Further Reading
  11. 3 All the Logically Possible Worlds
    1. 1. The Legacy of Logicism: The Endeavour of Reduction
    2. 2. Logic as a Toolbox of Formal Systems: Modal Logics
    3. 3. Up to Our Necks in Modality
    4. 4. A Philosopher’s Paradise
    5. 5. Paradise, Part I: Intensional Semantics
    6. 6. Paradise, Part II: Modality and Laws of Nature
    7. 7. Paradise, Part III: Counterfactual Conditionals
    8. 8. Paradise, Part IV: Supervenience: Materialism, Physicalism, and Determinism
    9. 9. Existential Angst: What Are Possible Worlds?
    10. 10. Lewis’ Modal Realism
    11. 11. Notes and Further Reading
  12. 4 All the Worlds Encoded in the Quantum State of the Cosmos
    1. 1. What Is Matter? From Lumps in the Void to Fields
    2. 2. The Quantum State: Probabilities for Classical Alternatives
    3. 3. Amplitudes and Quantum Fields
    4. 4. The Measurement Problem: Schrödinger’s Cat
    5. 5. Solving the Problem: The Usual Suspects
    6. 6. Everett’s Proposal: A Bluff?
    7. 7. Doing Better with Decoherence
    8. 8. A Sketch Definition of “World”
    9. 9. On What There Is: Objects as Patterns
    10. 10. A Reversal of Ideas
    11. 11. Probabilistic Angst: What Is Objective Probability?
    12. 12. Subjective Probability to the Rescue?
    13. 13. Notes and Further Reading
  13. 5 All the Worlds from the Primordial Bubbles
    1. 1. Comparing the Everettian and Cosmological Multiverses
    2. 2. A Golden Age of Cosmology
    3. 3. Inflation . . . Eternally
    4. 4. Glimpsing the Landscape of String Theory
    5. 5. Angst About Explanation
    6. 6. Expected Because Generic
    7. 7. Difficulties About Being Generic
    8. 8. Biased Sampling: Eddington’s Net
    9. 9. Selection Effects in Cosmology: The Anthropic Principle and the Cosmological Constant
    10. 10. Confirming a Theory of the Multiverse
    11. 11. Notes and Further Reading
  14. 6 Multiverses Compared—and Combined?
    1. 1. What I Believe
    2. 2. Why Don’t We See the Other Universes?
    3. 3. One Reality to Rule Them All?
    4. 4. Envoi
    5. 5. Notes and Further Reading
  15. Note about the Bibliography
  16. Bibliography
  17. Index

Index

anthropic principle, 199, 243–248. See also selection effects

approximation, appeal for interpreting quantum theory

as a merit, 153–154

as a defect, 167–171

Aristotle’s logic, 40, 65–55

Azhar, Feraz, 261, 262, 267

Bacon, Francis, 17

Bell, John

survey of proposals about measurement problem, 141–146, 292

against Everett, 149

biography, 183

Berkeley, George, 98–101

biased sampling. See selection effects

Bohm, David, 146, 182

Born-rule probabilities, in quantum theory, 143, 175–179

branch, in Everettian quantum theory. See Everettian multiverse

Carnap, Rudolph, 80, 82

causation, 26–29, 35–39

between possible worlds, 17–18, 280–283

coherent state, 152

combinatorial conception of possible worlds, 101–104

concrete/abstract distinction, 106–107, 119–121, 281

configuration, 127–129

confirmation of a cosmological multiverse, difficulties about, 238–240

constant of nature, as varying in string theory, 196–197

contingency,

of laws of nature, e.g. in Hume, 35–37, 41–42, 44–45

of laws of nature, in modern metaphysics, 84–85, 93–96

of laws of nature, in cosmological multiverse, 200–203, 218–222, 243–248

of laws of nature, in Wilson’s proposal, 284–290

of the state of the universe, 159–160, 200–205

Cosmic microwave background (CMB), 204–205

and standard model, 207–210, 211, 217, 277

cosmological constant, the problem of, 235, 247, 265–266

cosmological multiverse compared with Everettian multiverse, 200–205, 256–260

my assessment, 274–277

seeing other bubbles, 277

cosmology

from 1900 to 1960, 206–207

standard model, 207–211

counterfactual conditionals, 85–90

De Broglie, Louis, 145, 183

decision theory, 68–70, 178–179

decoherence, 150–155

without macrosystems, 202–203

Descartes, René, 27–29, 34

determination. See supervenience

determinism, 73–74, 96–98, 136–137

in Everettian quantum theory, 171–175

in Wilson’s proposal, 286–287

Deutsch, David, 188, 191

double-slit experiment, 278–280, 292

Eddington Arthur, 242, 263–264, 295–296

eigen-quantity, 135

eigenstate, 135

eigenvalue, 135

emergence, 121–122

equation of motion, 71

Everett, Hugh, 188. See also Everettian multiverse

Everettian multiverse, 146–179, 187–193

splitting or diverging of worlds, 148–150, 286–287

explaining definite appearances, 148–150

appealing to decoherence, 148, 150–160

objects as patterns, 160–166

my assessment, 167–171, 272–274

probability, 171–179

seeing other worlds/branches, 278–280

Everettian multiverse as philosophical multiverse, proposed by Wilson, 284–287

my assessment, 287–290

Everettian multiverse compared with cosmological multiverse, 200–205, 256–260, 274–277

explanation, philosophical accounts of, 222–225

extension. See reference, in semantics

field conception of matter

in classical physics, 125–127

in quantum mechanics of a quantum particle, 127–129

in quantum field theory, 132–134

fine tuning, as a problem, 196–198

illustrated by cosmological constant problem, 235

illustrated by mass of Higgs boson, 235–237

fine tuning, explained as being generic or typical, 199

illustrated by flatness and horizon problems, 226–227

in general terms, 228–229

by appeal to topology, 230–231

by appeal to effective field theories, 231–233

by appeal to probability, 233–234

difficulties about, 237–240

fine tuning, explained as being likely to be observed. See selection effects

fine tuning of several parameters, 245–247, 258, 265

flatness problem, 212–213, 226–227

Fock space, 132–134. See also quantum state, as assignment of amplitudes to classical configurations

Frege, Gottlob

his logicism, 46–48, 59–62

his semantics, 76–83

functionalism, 121–122

general relativity, 31–32, 274

generic, the strategy (Gen). See fine tuning, explained as being generic or typical

Hartle, James, 249–252, 266

Hartle and Srednicki’s Scheme, 249–252

Hertog, Thomas, 256, 266–267

history, in Everettian quantum theory. See Everettian multiverse

horizon problem, 212–213, 226–227

Hume, David, 35–37, 41, 48, 50–52, 291

imagination, as proposed explanation of modality, 98–101

induction, problem of, 35–37. See also Hume, David

inflation

as solving flatness and horizon problems, 195–196, 215–216

mechanism from string theory, 198

mechanism from inflaton field, 216–217

eternal, 217–218

intension. See sense, in semantics

intensional semantics, 76–83

interference terms, 151, 278–280

interpretations of quantum theory

as responses to measurement problem, surveyed, 141–146

Kent’s interpretation, 186

Landsman’s interpretation, 186

modal interpretations, 185

pragmatist interpretations, 184

Kant, Immanuel, 40–41, 48

Kent, Adrian, 186

Landsman, Nicolaas, 186

Laws of nature, 14–15, 84, 97, 286–287

Leggett, Anthony, 187

Leibniz, Gottfried, 40

Lewis, David

proposals about semantics, 76–83, 85–90

proposals about metaphysics, 83–85, 90–98

proposal about the nature of possible worlds, 110–112

his proposal applied to Everettian multiverse, 285–287

his critique of other proposals, 105–110, 110–112,

letter to Roz Chast, 112–114

against seeing other possible worlds, 17–18, 280–283, 293

Locke, John, 16–17

logic, from 1600 to 1900, 39–47

modal logic, 65–68, 83–90

logicism, 46–48, 59–62

materialism, 92–93, 95–96

mathematics, pure, 42–46, 54–55, 118–121

measurement problem of quantum theory, 134–141

proposed solutions, apart from Everett, 141–146

amplitudes interpreted in terms of probabilities of measurement results, 129–131

as a problem on the cosmic scale, 203–204, 260

mechanical philosophy, 26–29

method. See philosophical method

mixtures, probabilistic, 151–155

proper (ignorance-interpretable) vs. improper, 154–155

modal metaphysics, 64–68, 98–113

multiverse proposals, three proposals and three associated questions, 1–8

my views about, 8–9, 270–277

relations between proposals, 200–206, 218–222, 283–290

lack of causation between universes, 277–283

natural philosophy, 24–26

Newton, Isaac

his theory of gravity, 29–32, 47, 52–53

his influence on philosophy, 37–39

objects as patterns, in Everettian quantum theory. See Everettian multiverse

Observation, explanation of a value as likely to be observed, the strategy (Obs). See selection effects

Omega (Ω), the ratio of universe’s actual density to its critical density, 213, 226–227, 245–246

partial function, 79, 81

particle, 27–28

point particle, 72,124

quantum particle, 127–129, 130–131

as an excitation of quantum field, 134

philosophical method, 9–12

caution vs confidence about a concept, 12–15, 57–58

the beguiling power of words, 15–18

philosophical multiverse, 57–122

assessed, 270–271

contrasted with physical multiverses, 271–272

seeing other possible worlds, 280–283, 293

physicalism, 93–96

pilot-wave theory, 145–146, 182

Plutarch, 292

possible worlds

in Leibniz, 40, 83

use in semantics, 74–83, 85–90

use in metaphysics, 83–85, 90–98

debate about their nature, 98–113

probability

the qualitative problem in classical physics, 172–173

the qualitative problem in Everettian quantum physics, 174–175

the quantitative problem, 175–179

as an approach to explaining fine tuning, 233–234

See also Born-rule probabilities, mixtures

projection postulate, 143, 157. See also wave function

Pythagoreanism, xv, 119–121. See also concrete/abstract distinction

quantum gravity, 274

quantum state, as assignment of amplitudes to classical configurations

for one or more particles, 127–129, 130–131

for a field, 132–134

amplitudes interpreted in terms of probabilities of measurement results, 129–131

See also wave function

reduction

of pure mathematics to logic, 45–47, 48–49, 54–55, 59–62

in general, 59–64, 121–122

reference, in semantics, 76–83

relations between philosophy and physics, 2–3

in historical context, 24–26, 35–39

nowadays, 295–297

in assessing multiverse proposals, 8–9, 10–12, 271–272, 287–290

relative state, in Everettian quantum theory, 157

Rovelli, Carlo, 295–297

Saunders, Simon, 189, 191–192

Schrödinger’s cat, 139–141, 154–155. See also Everettian multiverse, objects as patterns

Schrödinger equation, 136–137

Schrödinger’s objection to Bohr, 169–171

selection effects

in general, 199, 222, 225, 240–243

in cosmology, 243–248, 265

sense, in semantics, 76–83

set theory, 45–47, 59–62, 64–65, 105–110

Srednicki, Mark, 249–252, 266

state space, of a physical system, 70–73

string theory

basic idea, 196–198, 201, 218–219

landscape, 219–222

prompting a multiverse proposal, xv, 196–198

superposition, 135–136, 137–139, 278–280

supervenience, 90–96

Tegmark, Max, 119–121, 254. See also concrete/abstract distinction

truth function, 78–79, 83

truth table, 79

as mistaken proposed explanation of modality, 101–104

typical, the strategy (Gen). See fine tuning, explained as being generic or typical

universe, sketch of thermal history, 210–212

vacuum states, 196–197

not a state of nothing, 256

Wallace, David, 160–165, 190–193

wave function, 129

collapse of the wave function, 143, 182

collapse as a physical process in cosmology, 260

universal wave function, in Everettian quantum theory, 146–147

universal wave function, in quantum cosmology, 200–205, 261

See also quantum state, as assignment of amplitudes to classical configurations

Weinberg, Steven, 187, 247–248

Wilson, Alastair

proposal that the Everettian multiverse is the philosophical multiverse, 283–287, 293–295

my assessment, 287–290

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 101–104

world, in Everettian quantum theory. See Everettian multiverse

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