chapter 10

Water Governance in the Prairie Provinces

Margot Hurlbert

Introduction: Water Governance and Adaptive Capacity

Water resources, water infrastructure, and livelihoods that depend on water (e.g., agriculture, forestry, and recreation) are expected to be significantly impacted by climate change in many regions of the world. An important determinant of a community’s ability to adapt to future climate change impacts and current climate variability is its institutional setting and the degree to which this setting facilitates or hinders the community’s adaptive capacity (Willems and Baumert 2003). As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) argues, nations with “well developed institutional systems are considered to have greater adaptive capacity,” and accordingly, developed countries have a better “institutional capacity to help deal with risks associated with future climate change” (2001: 896 and 897). Institutions contribute to the management of a community’s assets, the community members’ interrelationships, and in turn their relationships with natural resources. Both formal institutions (e.g., government, non-profit organizations, and civil society organizations) and informal institutions (e.g., social norms, values, and contexts) contribute to the relationships of people to each other and natural resources.

The institutional context of adaptive capacity can be studied through an investigation of the institutions involved in governance. Governance encompasses laws, regulations, and organizations, as well as governmental policies and actions, domestic activities, and networks of influence, including international market forces, the private sector, and civil society (Demetropoulou et al. 2010: 341). It entails the interactions among structures, processes, rules, and traditions that determine how people in societies make decisions and share power, exercise responsibility, and ensure accountability (Cundhill and Fabricius 2010: 14; Raik and Decker 2007; Lebel et al. 2006). Thus, governance involves institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their legal obligations, and mediate their differences (Kiparsky et al. 2012; Armitage et al. 2009). A rich literature has developed regarding adaptive governance, adaptive water governance, and specifically how the wider institutional context of governance can facilitate adaptation and improve adaptive capacity of communities. Adaptive capacity is especially important in responding to drought events. The governance framework surrounding drought (constituted by such things as water allocation laws, programs and policies facilitating drought preparation, and income stabilization in the event of drought) plays an important role.

A large body of literature is available on the adaptive governance of water and the subsumed institution of water law. Water law establishes the formal framework of rules within which people and organizations operate in relation to water, and it constitutes a foundation of water governance. Water governance refers to the range of political, social, economic, and administrative systems that develop, manage, and distribute water resources (GWP 2009: 14). It involves public and civil society organizations and comprises norms, programs, regulations, and laws relevant to the management of water resources (Hall 2005; see also Conference Board of Canada 2007; UNDP 2007; de Loe and Kreutzwiser 2007).

This chapter reviews adaptive institutional design principles applicable to water governance, the structure of water governance in the Canadian Prairie provinces, and the legal tools and instruments most germane to water and the occurrence of drought. These legal instruments are then analyzed in relation to the principles of adaptive governance.

Adaptive Institutional Design Principles

How do we recognize a system of water governance as adaptive? Within the adaptive capacity literature, several dimensions have been identified as important characteristics called institutional design principles, or features of governance systems that define an institutional system as adaptive. These dimensions include such things as “availability of information,” “openness for experimentation,” “flexibility,” “learning,” and others. The discussion in some cases is generic and applies to institutions in general (Gupta et al. 2010; Olsson et al. 2006; Folke et al. 2005; Gunderson and Holling 2002;) and in other cases applies to specific institutional regimes, such as water governance (Huntjens et al. 2012; Hill 2012; Cook et al. 2011; Young 2010; Mollenkamp and Kastens 2009; Huitema et al. 2009). The literature refers to a proper understanding of the complexities of the phenomenon of climate change, which include the requirements imposed by boundaries, levels, sectors, and diverse stakeholders, as well as the uncertainties surrounding, and long-term time frame of, climate change (Gupta et al. 2010; Frohlich and Knieling 2013; Cook et al. 2011). Table 1 outlines these various dimensions.

Adaptive governance entails a more flexible, participatory, experimental, collaborative, and learning-based design and approach to policy making and governance to increase adaptive capacity of institutions and sustainability of natural resources (Pahl-Wostl 2010; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Kallis et al. 2006; Tompkins and Adger 2004; Walters and Holling 1990; Lee and Lawrence 1986; Walters 1986). Adaptive governance shifts focus from rule-based, fixed organizations to a view of institutions as dynamic, flexible, pluralistic, and adaptive in order to cope with present and future uncertain climatic conditions and the limits of predictability (IISD 2006: 5; Carpenter and Gunderson 2001; Levin 1999). Adaptive governance then becomes a means to achieve adaptive capacity (Cook et al. 2011). Assessing whether a governance regime is adaptive entails a consideration of its institutional structure and its most important constituent parts (or instruments). For instance, crop insurance is an instrument that helps producers stabilize income in times of drought. Similarly, water infrastructure programs assist producers in building water-retention facilities and shallow pipelines, which also increase adaptive capacity in times of drought.

Institutional Structure of Water Governance

Water governance in the Prairie provinces involves many actors, including the government (all levels) and civil society organizations. Water in Canada is essentially the mandate of the provinces; however, there are shared jurisdictional roles with the federal government (e.g., transboundary flow, environmental protection) and some delegated function to local municipal governments (e.g., drinking water, land use, environmental protection). Nineteen federal government agencies are involved in water governance issues across Canada (Hurlbert et al. 2009). Environment Canada prescribes national drinking-water standards, monitors interprovincial streamflows, and facilitates the work of the Prairie Provinces Water Board (an agency overseeing the agreement apportioning flows between Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba). The International Joint Commission administers the Canada-US Boundary Waters Treaty. The number of federal agencies involved in water governance on the Prairies will be reduced as the Agri-Environmental Services Branch (formerly the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration) winds down through government layoffs and program terminations. This institution assisted rural adaptation and water infrastructure development and management in the Canadian Prairies and its dismissal clearly will affect the adaptive capacity of agricultural producers (see Chapters 5, 6, and 8 in this volume).

At the provincial level, each province has an entity responsible for water: in Saskatchewan it is the Water Security Agency, in Alberta it is the ministry of Alberta Environment and Parks, and in Manitoba it is the Manitoba Water Stewardship Division. However, other departments and government organizations also play a role in water. In Saskatchewan and Manitoba, government branches responsible for the environment and health also play a lesser role in relation to water. In Alberta, a 24-member, non-profit Alberta Water Council oversees the province’s water strategy and facilitates water disputes between sectors. In Saskatchewan, 19 members of the Saskatchewan Watershed Advisory Committee advise on water issues. All provinces have a host of watershed associations (some constituted pursuant to legislation, others non-profit) or conservation districts (Manitoba) involved in source water protection planning. Table 2 lists these institutions.

These organizations manage day-to-day decisions pertaining to water, including water allocation and decisions impacting water quality. Considerable similarity exists between the provincial organizations (as outlined in Table 2); however, the structure of water law used in each province differs. Table 3 summarizes the major features and differences between the legal institutional structures of water law in the three Prairie provinces.

This table is organized around the “principle” of water management for each province, which has been categorized by the author. Alberta states that the purpose of its water legislation is to support and promote the conservation and management of water balanced with the need to manage and conserve water resources to sustain a healthy environment, and the need for Alberta’s economic growth and prosperity (Water Act, R.S.A., c. W-3). The 25 Year Saskatchewan Water Security Plan states its vision of water as “supporting economic growth, quality of life and environmental well-being” (Water Security Agency 2012: 3). Water is considered a finite resource requiring a long-term perspective managed adaptively through collaborative processes. Although this plan mentions the interests of future generations, the legislation envisions management for economical and efficient use, distribution, and conservation of the water without mention of these future interests (the Saskatchewan Water Security Agency Act). The Manitoba Water Protection Act specifically states in its preamble that an abundant high-quality water supply is essential to sustain life now and in the future and is a “fundamental right of citizens”; the Water Resources Conservation Act states in its preamble that water is to be administered based on the precautionary principle and sustainable water resource management practices and that legislated priority is given to domestic, municipal purposes over agricultural, industrial, irrigation, and other purposes. Because of these principles, the Manitoba legislation has been termed as treating water as “public property.” These principles of water governance structure determine the nature of the instruments created by legislation and policy surrounding water covered in the next section.

Water Instruments

Within the context of laws, regulations, and policy, specific policy instruments are used to influence behaviour and effect a certain response (Anderson 2010: 242). Although many types of instruments exist (Gupta et al. 2013: 45; Baldwin et al. 2011; McManus 2009), this chapter focuses on market or economic interests—the property interest of water. Instruments can be classified into four categories: regulatory, economic and market-based, suasive, and management (Gupta et al. 2013: 45). Although this classification is not ideal because there is much overlap and potential for errors in deciding on a classification, examples of these instruments in the case of water (and drought specifically) are listed in Table 4.

There are three major instrumental contexts relating to the bundle of property rights associated with water; these contexts concern whether water is privately owned (as a saleable interest as in Alberta or Chile [Bauer 1998]), is public property (freely available to all), or is common property (owned by the water users). In the Prairie provinces, because the Crown owns all water and because water rights are allocated by licence, this property ownership distinction is not applicable; however, the property distinction is illustrative, as parallels can be seen in the characteristics of bundles of water rights received by way of water licence. Based on the three models of property rights (see Table 3), the three instrument models are as follows:

• Government agency management, generally associated with water regarded as public property: Government defers its authority for managing water to an agency, which assumes authority for directing who receives water rights in accordance with bureaucratic policies and procedures. In Canada, water is owned by the State (or Crown), and interests are allocated by licence. Often a first-in-time, first-in-right priority scheme applies (Hurlbert 2008). This model is implemented through water licences with terms and conditions, or regulatory instruments.

• User-based management, generally associated with water regarded as common property: Water users, or those with licence or rights to water, join together and coordinate their actions in managing water resources. Decision making is collective among users. Irrigation associations are an example of this type of ownership; another example is co-managed water resources (Plummer 2009). This model is an example of the use of management instruments to manage water (i.e., water is managed by private actors).

• Market, generally associated with water owned as private property: Water is allocated and reallocated through private transactions. Users can trade water rights through short-term or long-term agreements or temporary or permanent transfers, reallocating rights in response to prices (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 1995). This model is an example of an economic or market-based instrument.

Sometimes these instruments are used in combination. Alberta has led the provinces in developing a water market where transfer of water rights is allowed in accordance with an approved water management plan or by Cabinet order in the absence of such a plan. These transfers are possible only within six districts. However, water continues to be owned by the Crown; a licence is granted to property owners in respect of a parcel of land and then transferred with the land. It is possible to transfer a water interest. For example, Alberta’s water management plan for the South Saskatchewan River basin allows the director to consider applications to transfer water allocations within the basin (Alberta Environment and Parks 2015). This market-based management model used by Alberta is not a true laissez-faire market with vendors and purchasers conducting transactions purely based on market rules; a certain amount of oversight is retained in the review of these transactions, and, as such, the predictability of a market model is reduced somewhat (Hurlbert 2009a). This market model aligns with the principle of most beneficial use (outlined in the structure of water governance above). In Manitoba and Saskatchewan, the government agency management model is used, with the government allocating licences and determining priorities. All three provinces have employed a degree of user-based water management with the development of source water protection plans by local watershed committees. The persuasiveness of these plans and the permanence of this activity have yet to be determined.

Analysis

The provincial structures of water governance, with a specific focus on the property rights of water, are analyzed in this section in relation to the institutional design principles of adaptive governance. This analysis is carried out based on the characteristics of the provincial water governance structures described in Tables 3 and 4. This section discusses the economic or market instruments used in Alberta, but this description is perhaps overgeneralized. The Alberta water governance structure predominantly uses regulatory or government agency management instruments, but also makes considerable use of water management instruments (e.g., source water protection planning by irrigation associations and local watershed groups). Although Saskatchewan does not have tradable water interests, it uses government agency management instruments, but also makes considerable use of management instruments (e.g., source water protection planning by local watershed groups and irrigation associations).

Manitoba’s system has been characterized as using a government agency regulatory instrument and user-based management approach because it embraces both source water protection planning and principles of future sustainability. This assessment is summarized in Table 5.

Responsiveness

A tradable water interest, or market instrument, responds to the terms and conditions created within the market and the regulation of that market. The Alberta market model was developed specifically to more efficiently allocate and price water. The statutory provisions allowing transfer are touted by some researchers, and the Alberta government, as advancing the goals of efficient allocation of water interests and conservation in encouraging the transfer of surplus interests. This process is also described as creating a non-regulatory method of reducing wasteful use by creating an incentive to save water and transfer its marginal value for compensation (Percy 2004). Many would argue this market instrument does not capture the community value of water, nor does it facilitate political and ethical considerations in allocation decisions. The risk of the market instrument is that impacts on third parties not directly involved in a market transaction are neglected, and third parties have difficulty enforcing their interests in a court of law. These characteristics make the market instrument in relation to water property rights not as responsive as a system whereby governments and all users can hear and determine water issues. It should be kept in mind that only a small fraction of Alberta’s water governance structure entails tradable water interests.

However, studies of water governance that have focused on how the institutional context of the regulatory tools of government have managed water structures in Alberta and Saskatchewan have concluded that challenges in relation to responsiveness exist. One study concluded that improvements are needed to increase the efficacy and effectiveness of organizations and processes of water governance, as much fragmentation impedes setting clear policy objectives and implementing, assessing, monitoring, and evaluating policy (Hurlbert et al. 2009: 123; see also Bakker 2007). Further, there is limited institutional coordination and integration, which is a result of management rigidity (Hurlbert and Diaz, 2013). To improve responsiveness, a robust channel of communication between local communities and water governance organizations is needed (Hurlbert et al. 2009: 124).

An abundance of academic literature concludes that management instruments effected by local watershed governance and participatory resource co-governance (such as that practised by irrigation associations) are more responsive (e.g., Hickey and Mohan 2004; Brooks 2002). More research is needed to determine conclusively which structures respond in more timely and appropriate manners. It would appear that a market instrument might allow timely response to certain economic interests, whereas water user conflicts in relation to scarcity of water in times of drought might be best addressed in a timelier manner by regulatory government agency tools or user-based management tools.

Variety of problem frames

The multitude of government agencies involved in water management results in a variety of problem frames in relation to water issues. In the Canadian constitution, water is not treated as a single topic assigned to one level of government (federal versus provincial). The provincial government has powers that relate to water, including property (generally including water in its definition).1 The federal government also has certain powers in relation to water, albeit historically somewhat more limited than the provinces.2 Limits would include powers in relation to water allocation to facilitate navigation and in relation to water quality and quantity to maintain and preserve fish populations and their habitat. The federal government takes control of water once it crosses an interprovincial or international boundary, in accordance with the federal head of power relating to interprovincial works and undertakings (Kennett 1991). Often overlap exists and both levels of government share jurisdiction in relation to certain aspects.

Although the multitude of water organizations existing at each level of government would appear to give rise to the possibility of a variety of problem frames, this is not the case in practice. When the federal government developed a Federal Water Policy in 1987, it was not fully supported with the necessary resources and never fully implemented (Hurlbert and Cokal, 2009). Although there have been numerous calls for a renewed Canadian water strategy (e.g., Barlow 2011), a comprehensive strategy has not been formulated and does not appear on the federal government’s agenda. As a result, water is increasingly governed provincially. In addition, the federal government has withdrawn from many water governance activities it had historically been involved in, such as irrigation infrastructure (see Chapter 6 by Warren on irrigation in this volume) and community pastures. This withdrawal has negatively impacted the variety of problem frames in relation to water as well as the polycentric nature of Canadian water governance.

In the event of future water shortages, the lack of a federal water mandate could also have significant implications if interprovincial conflicts arise. The current Master Agreement on Apportionment between Canada, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba contains a strict formula for sharing water.3 In the event of severe water shortage, the lack of drinking water for Saskatchewan residents will be inconsequential, as the formula is the only mechanism of allocation. This strict formula was developed partly as a response to disagreement between Saskatchewan and Alberta on what developments should occur and to a mandate change several decades ago. This historical impasse should not be forgotten as water shortages loom on the horizon. Research confirms that having response mechanisms in place is important in addressing issues and potential conflicts (Adger 2003).

The addition of a tradable water interest adds an important economic tool for capturing surplus water and creating financial incentives to conserve and realize efficiencies in relation to water allocations. More research is required to ascertain if these market instruments solve these problems in relation to fully allocated watersheds. A tradable market water instrument allows only the considerations built into the legislated regulatory fabric of the market to be reflected in the problem frame. Many issues could arise if and when shortages of water are so severe—as is in the case of extreme drought—that the traded water interests cannot be met within Alberta while honouring the historic water agreement between Canada, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba.

Learning and institutional memory

The market instrument—the tradable water interest—responds to current conditions at the time it is used. As such, any learning and institutional memory would relate to the actors participating in the market. At present, trades of these interests are sparse, and details such as this require further research. Studies have been conducted on the institutional context of water governance in relation to learning and institutional memory in the Prairie provinces—the regulatory instrument or government agency–based water management (Diaz et al. 2009)—and some of the findings detailed below arise from this work.

The Prairie provinces have been managing the water resource since its transfer to them by the federal government in the 1930s. One of the biggest challenges facing all three provinces is the aging workforce and the retirement of key personnel who have the institutional memory of managing this resource. It will become increasingly important to develop strategies to document this knowledge, transfer it through mentorship to the emerging younger workforce, and maintain access to the retiring workforce through novel retention arrangements.

Alberta has a long history of water policy, strategy, and planning through its Water for Life initiative. Manitoba’s history relates to its drainage and conservation district management. Saskatchewan’s first water strategy was issued in 2012, but one Crown corporation has been tasked with water management in Saskatchewan for decades. The relatively recent use of the management instrument—local watershed-source protection planning—should facilitate the transfer of knowledge of water governance between these local watershed groups and the water users (i.e., the public and other stakeholders) interacting with these groups.

This process will provide an additional strategy to transfer knowledge and retain past learnings to address the issue of pending civil-servant retirements.

The federal government’s lack of involvement in water and water strategy since 1987 leaves an important gap in jurisdictional strategy, which potentially hinders long-term learning and institutional memory. The Prairie Provinces Water Board’s mandate relates to implementing a historic water sharing arrangement. Particularly given anticipated future drought, the absence of a long-term national plan limits the possibility of a flexible institutional governance environment able to identify social needs and problems in relation to impending climate change, balance competing interests, and execute and implement solutions. As a result, drought or extreme climate events will be addressed in a reactive manner, instead of using a flexible, proactive policy response, which would stimulate learning.

Trust

The market instrument—the tradable water interest—creates a market for the transfer of water interests. If market rules are clear and transparent, those able to access the market will in all likelihood have a degree of trust in the market. However, the broader institutional structure of water governance in this context is arguably different. Those without access to water interests would in all likelihood not experience the same trust. Further research defining and exploring trust and the perspectives of participants in water governance is needed. Previous studies have expressed some scepticism as to how trustful participants might be of market and government contexts concerning water governance, specifically in relation to the resolution of conflicts over water (e.g., Hurlbert and Diaz 2013).

The increasing spectre of water shortages is expected to amplify potential conflicts among current water rights holders. The current institutional context appears not well situated to respond to these conflicts. The Saskatchewan and Manitoba system appears situated within a government review and reconciliation framework; Alberta’s within a court and litigation–based framework. Albeit the former may be more conducive to timely resolution of conflict with less expense, both systems are in need of improved access to justice. Failure to provide this access may erode trust and ultimately legitimacy.

Capacity Building

It is difficult to postulate how the market instrument—the tradable water interest—might impact information, leadership, and resource capacity. Research methods teasing out insights in this regard also raise many challenges in relation to both choice of method and implications of results. However, the following case study uncovered in previous research studies is informative.

The Institutional Adaptation to Climate Change Project (http://www.parc.ca/mcri) uncovered a case study wherein Alberta’s water transfer provisions—or market instruments—were used in the 2001 drought, but this case also illustrated the usefulness of user associations—or management instruments. Usually during years of water shortages, regional staff of Alberta Environment had to advise junior licensees (or last-in-time licensees) that they needed to shut down their pumps and were being cut off. In the St. Mary’s River in 2001, there was a severe water shortage, which was going to allow only six or seven licences to operate. Stop orders would have had to be issued on 500 to 600 licences, which could have dried up the river. Sharing provisions that were put into the Water Act between 1993 and 1996 allowed two licences to share water back and forth (if physically possible), as long as no other licensee complained that it hurt their right. Irrigation districts sent out letters to their licensees and held meetings to discuss water shortages. A smaller percentage of water allocation for each licence was agreed on (approximately 60%). However, because irrigators and other users of water could not meet their agricultural or business needs with this smaller allocation of water, novel arrangements were made. Farmers transferred their allocation to other farmers in exchange for agreed-upon consideration, which allowed at least one farmer to irrigate and grow a crop that year. Approximately 70 licensees did not agree to the sharing arrangement and received stop orders (Hurlbert 2009b, 2009c; see also Chapter 11 by Corkal et al. in this volume).

This case study illustrates an important finding. Although institutional contexts are often portrayed as mutually exclusive totalities (as illustrated above in the characterization of the three Prairie provinces’ water governance structures), the reality is that the Prairie provinces use a combination of institutional contexts and thus a combination of instruments that embrace these concepts. How these instruments are employed and accessed, and therefore how they operate in conjunction with one another, warrants further consideration and study.

Equity

As with many of the other indicia of adaptive governance, it is difficult to assess the equity in relation to water governance instruments without appropriate primary social science research. Perceptions of participants in the institutional water governance context on legitimacy and accountability would be particularly germane. However, failing this, the case of Chile, where tradable water property interests are the sole water instrument in relation to water property interests, sheds some light on the use of one sole instrument. In Chile, a Water Code established a market for water rights, where water rights are treated as any commodity, so they could be sold, rented, and transferred to other people. The government has a very limited role in administering water transactions and water conflicts, since they are defined as issues to be resolved between private individuals. Given that water resources are fully allocated in some areas, many local communities and small, medium, or poor farmers may be without water rights and without the means to purchase them (Reyes et al. 2009; Bauer 1998: 67).

The adoption of a neo-liberal Water Code—where water is considered a privately owned commodity—has been an imposition of a top-down system that has not only limited the capacity of governance to establish adaptive water strategies at the regional level but also has imposed a process of competition in a context characterized by an unequal distribution of power (Galaz 2003), resulting in an adaptive capacity to water scarcities that is concentrated in a small number of large producers with the ability to more easily obtain access to water rights. This situation has resulted in inequitable water governance structure in times of drought.

Political Support

The selection of water instruments predominantly used by the Prairie provinces would appear to have little relationship to a province’s support for climate change action. Although the market-based beneficial-use water governance structure of Alberta places considerable onus on individuals to make informed decisions in relation to risks such as climate change, the Alberta government has had a climate change strategy for some time. The Climate Change and Emissions Management Act (2003) was a precursor to Alberta’s Climate Change Strategy (2008) and focused on risks and vulnerabilities to water. In addition to establishing a carbon offset market and providing consumer rebates in relation to energy efficient products, two programs were also introduced, a greenhouse gas reporting program and a greenhouse gas reduction program. These relate to the establishment of a greenhouse gas limit. In 2003, Alberta also created its Water for Life strategy focusing on issues of quantity, quality, and conservation of water, which has continuously been reviewed and revised (AWC n.d., 2009, 2007, 2005) The strategy initiated three important activities: 1) planning for future management of water via the provincial Climate Change Adaptation Strategy; 2) developing land-use frameworks; and 3) watershed planning through local watershed groups. All of these activities are important for adaptation to climate change.

In Saskatchewan, a previous New Democrat Party government issued an Energy and Climate Change Plan, which was a cross-governmental vision in response to climate change and the development of a province-wide climate change adaptation strategy that included working with research organizations and supporting critical local research on climate change and adaptation (Government of Saskatchewan 2007). Currently, climate legislation relating to mitigation remains on the legislative agenda but is yet to be proclaimed. However, the 25 Year Saskatchewan Water Security Plan (Water Security Agency 2012) states that work with research partners on climate change impacts will continue to identify possibilities for adaptation.

In Manitoba, climate change considerations are acknowledged within legislation and the climate change strategy document Adapting to Climate Change: Preparing for the Future (2015). At the legislative level, climate change is acknowledged in the Water Resources Act. In its preamble, the Act states the following:

In light of the fact that future domestic needs and the potential effects of climate change are unknown, such a scheme should be based on the precautionary principle and on sustainable water resource management practices. (n.p.)

In its climate change plans, the Government of Manitoba discusses actions implemented to date and future directions. Actions-to-date relating to climate change adaptation include developing integrated watershed management plans, revising flood protection plans, expanding Manitoba’s hydrometric network, introducing incentive-based programs, and developing research relating to land-use planning (Government of Manitoba 2008: 47). The document addresses sector-based climate change adaptation. For example, within the agricultural sector, “climate friendly” best management practices are recommended, such as “improved handling, treatment, storage and application of manure to reduce CH4 and N2O emissions” (Government of Manitoba 2008: 3). Within the energy sector, the Manitoba government emphasizes minimizing reliance on fossil fuels and maximizing energy efficiency through programming (Government of Manitoba 2008: 4). The role of municipalities in promoting adaptive practices is also discussed through the idea of “climate friendly planning.”

A challenge in the Prairie provinces’ water governance structures in recent years relates to the long-term and comprehensive consideration of climate change adaptation within the water governance agenda (Hurlbert et al. 2009). Although some inroads have been made by each province, it would appear that a considerable opportunity exists for expanding policy in this area.

Clearly defined boundaries

User-based management instruments can result in sandbox politics and can fail to provide clearly defined boundaries with respect to water interests, resolution of uncertain water relations, and water strategies into the future. This is due to the participatory, iterative nature of user-based management processes. However, use of this form of instrument of governance, in combination with other approaches, such as that of government agency management and perhaps a well-constructed and limited market instrument, can be highly beneficial. The key is establishing clear conditions of market instruments, well-conceived government management back stops, and functions within the water governance structure that facilitate success of user-based management instruments. Currently, employment of user-based management instruments in relation to source water protection planning and day-to-day management of irrigation districts has proven highly successful.

Market-based instruments in relation to water governance must be as clearly defined and transparent to the public as the mechanisms within the legislative, regulatory, and policy foundation establishing them. In Alberta, use of this instrument and fulfillment of these institutional principles require further research. Because its use has been relatively infrequent, the urgency of this research is reduced.

Bakker and Cook (2011) have concluded that there is an urgent need to establish clear roles for all of the various actors involved in water governance and coordinate their activities to avoid increasing balkanization of water management. As provincial strategies such as Alberta and Saskatchewan’s become increasingly known and embraced by the public, it is anticipated that the need for involvement will be met. In recent years, the provinces have embarked on important initiatives to identify and coordinate actors involved in governance; however, further attention is warranted. Some uncertainty exists in relation to jurisdictional matters (such as First Nations’ interests) and interprovincial issues, which may arise in the face of increasing water shortages and the federal government’s withdrawal from involvement in water governance. Establishing and supporting local watershed groups are important components of comprehensive water planning and management, as in the geographical space of the watershed all actors, all levels of government, and all issues come together. This geographical space is the site of integrated watershed management. Although these groups embody the user-based management principle, they hold an important place within the water governance structure by helping to make boundaries clear, real, and understood by local people.

Conclusion

This analysis has illustrated some of the considerations pertinent to regulatory instruments (government-allocated water licence interests), user management instruments (local watershed groups and irrigation associations), and market instruments (transferable water interests) in the context of climate change and expected increasing variability in climate, specifically drought. An institutional context of water governance structure whereby multiple water instruments operate has been used because water property interests in Canada are best described as a bundle of entitlements effected through a combination of management, regulatory, and market instruments.

On their face, market instruments appear to respond poorly to all peoples’ interests, reflect only economic problem frames, and exclude individuals who are without tradable interests. As a result, market instruments scored lower in relation to the institutional design principles of adaptive governance (trust, capacity building, and equity). However, positive examples of adaptation emerge when analyzing the use of market instruments in combination with regulatory instruments and management instruments. These cases, of course, are illustrative only; more research using different methods is required to provide additional evidence.

Assessments of water governance structures in the Prairie provinces have concluded that more effort is required to define institutional boundaries, communicate roles of water organizations, and coordinate among water organizations. The federal government’s absence from the water policy field is worrisome given the prospects of increasing climate variability and drought in the future. As the impacts of future climate change add strain on water resources and the incidents of drought increase, more work will be required on comprehensive sectoral adaptation to leverage and optimize the initial work that has been done to date. Using an institutional framework and the institutional principles of adaptive governance in this preparation would help reduce vulnerabilities of individuals and communities.

notes

1 These headings include publicly owned lands, mines, minerals and royalties, property and civil rights, local works and undertakings, and natural resources. which include the right to make laws in relation to the development, conservation, and management of non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province. It is through the first heading “lands” that the provincial jurisdiction to water primarily resides. In traditional Canadian common law, water rights transferred with the land with which it was associated. “Land” is defined as “every species of ground, soil or earth whatsoever, as meadows, pastures, woods, moors, waters, marshes, furs and heath” Jowitt (1959: 1053).

2 These include federal lands (national parks, Indian reserves), trade and commerce, navigation and shipping, seacoast and inland fisheries, works for the general advantage of Canada, entering into treaties, and matters not specifically assigned to the provinces (s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1982). The federal government is responsible for ensuring the safety of drinking water within areas of federal jurisdiction, such as national parks and Indian reserves, and water quality in respect of inter-jurisdictional waters (Canada Water Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-11).

3 Water is shared such that 50% of flows must be passed to Saskatchewan, which in turn must pass the same proportion to Manitoba (Prairie Provinces Water Board, The 1969 Master Agreement on Apportionment and Bylaws, Rules and Procedures).

References

Adger, W. 2003. “Social Aspects of Adaptive Capacity.” Pp. 29–49 in J. Smith, R. Klein, and S. Huq (eds.), Climate Change, Adaptive Capacity and Development. London: Imperial College Press.

Alberta Environment and Parks. 2015. South Saskatchewan River Basin Approved Water Management Plan. Available at: ep.alberta.ca/water/programs-and-services/river-management-frameworks/south-saskatchewan-river-basin-approved-water-management-plan/default.aspx. Accessed November 24, 2015.

Anderson, J.E. 2010. Public Policymaking: An introduction. Hampshire, UK: Cengage Learning.

Armitage, D. 2005. “Adaptive Capacity and Community-based Natural Resource Management.” Environmental Management 35, no. 6: 703–15.

Armitage, D.R., R. Plummer, F. Berkes, R.I. Arthur, A.T. Charles, I.J. Davidson-Hunt, A.P. Diduck, N.C. Doubleday, D.S. Johnson, M. Marschke, P. McConney, E.W. Pinkerton, and E.K. Wollenburg. 2009. “Adaptive Co-management for Social-ecological Complexity.” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 7, no. 2: 95–102.

AWC (Alberta Water Council). n.d. About Us. Alberta Water Council website. http://www.albertawatercouncil.ca/AboutUs/tabid/54/Default.aspx.

———. 2005. Review of Implementation Progress of Water for Life, 2003–2004. Edmonton, AB: AWC.

———. 2007. Review of Implementation Progress of Water for Life, 2005–2006. Edmonton, AB: AWC.

———. 2009. Review of Implementation Progress of Water for Life, 2006–2008. Edmonton, AB: AWC.

Bakker, K. (ed.). 2007. Eau Canada: The Future of Canada’s Water. Vancouver: IBC Press.

Bakker, K., and C. Cook. 2011. “Water Governance in Canada: Innovation and Fragmentation.” Water Resources Development 27, no. 2: 275–89.

Baldwin, R., M. Cave, and M. Lodge. 2011. Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barlow, M. 2011. “What You Don’t Know About a Deal You Haven’t Heard Of.” The Globe ad Mail. January 6, 2011.

Bauer, C.J. 1998. Against the Current. Privatization, Water Markets, and the State in Chile. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Brooks, D.B. 2002. Water, Local-Level Management. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.

Bruns, B.R., and R. Meinzen-Dick. 1995. “Frameworks for Water Rights: An Overview of Institutional Options.” Chapter 1 in B.R. Bruns, C. Ringler, and R. Meinzen-Dick (eds.), Water Rights Reform: Lessons for Institutional Design. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Carpenter, S.R., and L.H. Gunderson. 2001. “Coping with Collapse: Ecological and Social Dynamics in Ecosystem Management.” BioScience 51: 451–57.

Conference Board of Canada. 2007. Navigating the Shoals, Assessing Water Governance and Management in Canada. Toronto: Conference Board of Canada. http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.asp?rnext=1993. Accessed 23 December 2007.

Cook, J., S. Freeman, E. Levine, and M. Hill. 2011. Shifting Course: Climate Adaptation for Water Management Institutions. Washington: World Wildlife Fund. http://www.adaptiveinstitutions.org.

Cundill, G., and C. Fabricius. 2010. “Monitoring the Governance Dimension of Natural Resource Co-management.” Ecology and Society 15, no. 1: Article 15.

de Loe, R., and R. Kreutzwiser. 2007. “Challenging the Status Quo: The Evolution of Water Governance in Canada.” Pp. 85–103 in K. Bakker (ed.), Eau Canada: The Future of Canada’s Water. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Demetropoulou, L., N. Nikolaidis, V. Papadoulakis, K. Tsakiris, T. Koussouris, N. Kalogerakis, and K. Koukaras. 2010. “Water Framework Directive Implementation in Greece: Introducing Participation in Water Governance – The Case of the Evrotas River Basin Management Plan.” Environmental Policy and Governance 20: 336–49.

Diaz, H., M. Hurlbert, J. Warren, and D. Corkal. 2009. Saskatchewan Water Governance Assessment Final Report. Regina, SK: Prairie Adaptation Research Collaborative. http://www.parc.ca/mcri/gov01.php.

Dietz, R., E. Ostrom, and P.C. Stern. 2003. “The Struggle to Govern the Commons.” Science 302, no. 5652: 1907–12.

Folke, C., T. Hahn, P. Olsson, and J. Norberg. 2005. “Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems.” Annual Review of Environmental Resources 30: 411–73.

Frohlich, J., and J. Knieling. 2013. “Conceptualizing Climate Change.” Pp. 9–26 in J. Knieling and W. Leal Filho (eds.), Climate Change Governance. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.

Galaz, V. 2003. Privatizing the Commons: Natural Resources, Equity and the Chilean Water Market. Santiago: FLASCO.

Government of Manitoba. 2008. Climate Change Strategy. Winnipeg, MB: Government of Manitoba.

———. 2015. Adapting to Climate Change: - Preparing for the Future. https://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/beyond_kyoto/adapting_to_climate_change.pdf Accessed November 24, 2015.

Government of Saskatchewan. 2007. Energy and Climate Change Plan 2007. Regina: Premier’s Office.

Gunderson, L.H., and C.S. Holling (eds.). 2002. Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington: Island Press.

Gupta J., C. Termeer, J. Klostermann, S. Meijerink, M. van den Brink, P. Jong, S. Nooteboom, and E. Bergsma. 2010. “The Adaptive Capacity Wheel: A Method to Assess the Inherent Characteristics of Institutions to Enable the Adaptive Capacity of Society.” Environment Science and Policy 13: 459–71.

Gupta, J., N. ven der Grijp, and O. Kuik (eds.). 2013. Climate Change, Forests and REDD: Lessons for Institutional Design. Abington: Routledge Publishers.

GWP (Global Water Partnership). 2009. Integrated Water Resources Management. Stockholm: GWP. http://www.gwp.org/Global/ToolBox/Publications/Background%20papers/04%20Integrated%20Water%20Resources%20Management%20(2000)%20English.pdf. Accessed 8 June 2010.

Hall, A.W. 2005. “Water: Water and Governance.” In G. Ayre and R. Callway (eds.), Governance for Sustainable Development: A Foundation for the Future: London: Earthscan.

Hatfield-Dodds, S., R. Nelson, and D.C. Cook. 2007. “Adaptive Governance: An Introduction and Implications for Public Policy.” Presentation at the Australia New Zealand Society for Ecological Economics Conference, Noosa, AU, 4–5 July 2007.

Hickey, S., and G. Mohan. 2004. “Towards Participation as Transformation: Critical Themes and Challenges.” Pp. 3–24 in S. Hickey and G. Mohan (eds.), Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development. London: Zed Books.

Hill, M. 2012. “Characterizing Adaptive Capacity in Water Governance Arrangements in the Context of Extreme Events.” Pp. 339–65 in W. Leal Filho (ed.), Climate Change and the Sustainable Use of Eater Resources. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.

Huitema, D., E. Mostert, W. Egas, S. Moellenkamp, C. Pahl-Wostl, and R. Yulcin. 2009. “Adaptive Water Governance: Assessing the Institutional Prescriptions of Adaptive (Co)Management from a Governance Perspective and Defining a Research Agenda.” Ecology and Society 14, no. 1: 26–45.

Huntjens, P., L. Leibel, C. Pahl-Wostl, J. Camkind, R. Schulzee, and N. Kranzf. 2012. “Institutional Design Propositions for the Governance of Adaptation to Climate Change in the Water Sector.” Global Environmental Change 22: 67–81.

Hurlbert, M. 2008. “Canadian Legal Framework of Water and Governance in the Prairie Provinces, Critical Analysis of Adaptation to Climate Change.” World Water Congress, Montpellier, France, September 2008.

———. 2009a. “Comparative Water Governance in the Four Western Provinces.” Prairie Forum 34, no. 1: 181–207.

———. 2009b. “Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into the Law.” Retfaerd Argang 32, no. 3: 23–39.

———. 2009c. “The Adaptation of Water Law to Climate Change.” International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 1, no. 3: 230–40.

Hurlbert, M., D.R. Corkal, and H. Diaz. 2009. “Government and Civil Society: Adaptive Water Management in the South Saskatchewan River Basin.” Prairie Forum 34, no. 1: 181–210.

Hurlbert, M., and H. Diaz. 2012. “Governance in Chile and Canada – A Comparison of Adaptive Characteristics.” The Governance of Adaptation Conference, Amsterdam, NL, 22–23 March 2012.

Hurlbert, M., and H. Diaz. 2013. “Water Governance in Chile and Canada: A Comparison of Adaptive Characteristics.” Ecology and Society 18, no. 4: 61–76.

IISD (International Institute of Sustainable Development). 2006. Designing Policies in a World of Uncertainty, Change and Surprise: Adaptive Policy-Making for Agriculture and Water Resources in the Face of Climate Change. Winnipeg, MB, and New Delhi, IN: International Development Research Centre and The Energy and Resources Institute.

IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2001. Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Technical Summary. A Report of Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Geneva: IPCC, World Meteorological Organization, and United Nations Environment Programme.

Jowitt, E. 1959. The Dictionary of English Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell.

Kallis, G., N. Videira, P. Antunes, G. Pereira, C.L. Spash, H. Coccossis, S.C. Quintana, L. del Moral, D. Hatzilacou, G. Lobo, A. Mexa, P. Paneque, B.P. Mateos, and R. Santos. 2006. “Participatory Methods for Water Resources Planning.” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 24, no. 2: 215–34.

Kennett, S.A. 1991. Managing Interjurisdictional Waters in Canada: A Constitutional Analysis. Pp. 23–28. Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law.

Kiparsky, M., A. Milman, and S. Vicuna. 2012. “Climate and Water: Knowledge of Impacts to Actions on Adaptation.” Annual Review of Environmental Resources 37: 163–94.

Kjaer, A.M. 2004. Governance. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Lebel, L., J.M. Anderies, C. Cambell, S. Folke, S. Hatfield-Dodds, T.P. Hughes, and J. Wilson. 2006. “Governance and the Capacity to Manage Resilience in Regional Social-ecological Systems.” Ecology and Society 11, no. 1: Article 19.

Lee, K.N., and J. Lawrence. 1986. “Adaptive Management: Learning from the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program.” Environmental Law 16: 431–60.

Levin, S.A. 1999. “Towards a Science of Ecological Management.” Conservation Ecology 3, no. 2: Article 6. http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss2/art6/.

McManus, P. 2009. Environmental Regulation. Australia: Elsevier.

Mollenkamp, S., and B. Kastens. 2009. “Institutional Adaptation to Climate Change: Current Status and Future Strategies in the Elba Basin, Germany.” In F. Luwig, P. Kabat, H. van Schaik, and M. van der Valk (eds.), Climate Change Adaptation in the Water Sector. London: Earthscan.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 1994. Reducing Environmental Pollution: Looking Back, Thinking Ahead. Paris: OECD.

Olsson, P., L.H. Gunderson, S.R. Carpenter, P. Ryan, L. Lebel, C. Folke, and C.S. Holling. 2006. “Shooting the Rapids: Navigating Transitions to Adaptive Governance of Socio-Ecological Systems.” Ecology and Society 11, no. 1: 1–18.

Olsson, P., C. Folke, and F. Berkes. 2004. “Adaptive Co-management for Building Resilience in Social-ecological Systems.” Environmental Management 34, no. 1: 75–90.

Ostrom, E. 2010. “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems.” American Economic Review 100, no. 3: 641–72.

Ostrom, E. 2011. “Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework.” Policy Studies Journal: 39, no. 1: 7–27.

Pahl-Wostl, C. 2010. “Water Governance in Times of Change.” Environmental Science & Policy 13: 567–70.

Pahl-Wostl, C., P. Kabat, and J. Möltgen (eds.). 2007a. Adaptive and Integrated Water Management. Coping with Complexity and Uncertainty. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Pahl-Wostl, C., M. Craps, A. Dewulf, E. Mostert, D. Tabara, and T. Raillieu. 2007b. “Social Learning and Water Resources Management.” Ecology and Society 12, no. 2: Article 5. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art5/.

Pahl-Wostl, C., J. Sendzimir, P. Jeffrey, J. Aerts, G. Berkamp, and K. Cross. 2007c. “Managing Change toward Adaptive Water Management through Social Learning.” Ecology and Society 12, no. 2: 30–48.

Percy, D. 2004. “The Limits of Western Canadian Water Allocation Law.” Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 14: 313–327.

Plummer, R. 2009. “The Adaptive Co-management Process: An Initial Synthesis of Representative Models and Influential Variables.” Ecology and Society 14, no. 2: Article 24. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art24/.

Pretty, J., and H. Ward. 2001. “Social Capital and the Environment.” World Development 29, no. 2: 209–27.

Pretty, J. 2003. “Social Capital and the Collective Management of Resources.” Science 302: 1912–14.

Raik, D.B., and D.J. Decker. 2007. “A Multisector Framework for Assessing Community-based Forest Management: Lessons from Madagascar.” Ecology and Society 12, no. 1: Article 14. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art14/.

Reyes, B., S. Salas, E. Schwartz, and E. Espinoza. 2009. Chile Water Governance Assessment Final Report. http://www.parc.ca/mcri/pdfs/papers/gov03.pdf.

Stavins, R.N. 2003. “Experience with Market-based Environmental Policy Instruments.” Pp. 355–435 in K.-G. Mäler and J. Vincent (eds.), Handbook of Environmental Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Tompkins, E.L., and W.N. Adger. 2004. “Does Adaptive Management of Natural Resources Enhance Resilience to Climate Change?” Ecology and Society 9, no. 2: Article 10.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2007. Energy and Environment – Water Governance. New York: UNDP. http://www.undp.org/water/about_us.html. Accessed 25 September 2007.

Walters, C.J. 1986. Adaptive Management of Renewable Resources. New York, NY: McGraw Hill.

Walters, C.J., and C.S. Holling. 1990. “Large-scale Management Experiments and Learning by Doing.” Ecology 71: 2060–68.

Water Security Agency. 2012. 25 Year Saskatchewan Water Security Plan. Regina: Queen’s Printer. https://www.wsask.ca/Global/About%20WSA/25%20Year%20Water%20Security%20Plan/WSA_25YearReportweb.pdf.

Willems, S., and K. Baumert. 2003. Institutional Capacity and Climate Actions. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Young, O. 2010. “Institutional Dynamics: Resilience, Vulnerability, and Adaptation in Environmental and Resource Regimes.” Global Environmental Change 20: 378–85.