10

Newfoundland and Canada: Confederation and the Search
for Stability

Raymond B. Blake

In September 1864 when Maritime politicians met at Charlottetown to consider union, Newfoundlanders were not invited. They were, however, asked to Quebec City, when delegates reassembled there a month later. Conservative Deputy Premier and Protestant, F.B.T. Carter, and Ambrose Shea, Liberal Leader and representative of the Catholic minority, were excited about Confederation. They saw Confederation as Newfoundland’s best hope to deal with its depressing isolation, reliance on a single staple commodity (codfish), and a way to spur economic diversification. Though Confederation had its proponents, union was overwhelmingly rejected in the 1869 election because voters saw no economic or political benefit. The issue of Confederation arose periodically after 1869, but it was not seriously debated again until after the Second World War. During this later debate, proponents of union argued that Confederation would provide economic and social security as well as rid Newfoundland of its long history of underdevelopment and poverty. The opponents of Confederation again fought to maintain the country’s independence and sovereignty, promising never to sell their birth-right to Canada. While the debate might have been similar, the outcome was not. Confederation had a powerful champion in Joseph R. Smallwood and a rural population that demanded the state take a great interest in their social and economic well-being. In 1949, Newfoundlanders opted for union with Canada by majority vote.

Newfoundland in the 1860s

In the 1860s Newfoundland was neither great in population nor wealth. Many of its 162,000 residents were dispersed along the coastline and depended on the cod and seal fisheries, which together accounted for 95 percent of exports. Any decline in catch, such as had occurred in the 1860s, created social and economic paralysis. In the four years to 1865 the debt grew from £18,000 to £36,000 as the country experienced its worst economic depression in twenty years. The government ran a deficit on current account, and relief payments accounted for 23 percent of current revenue as poverty levels rose dramatically.1

In the mid-nineteenth century, Newfoundland struggled with the quality of its human capital as defined by literacy and education, which had become an essential tool for fostering a better personal and national life and for spurring a lively intellectual debate about a nation’s goals. High levels of education and literacy are necessary for social transformation and liberation, but those were lacking in Newfoundland, especially outside St. John’s. Alan Macpherson’s analysis of parish records for Hermitage on the South Coast estimated a literacy rate among the young married population of only 18 percent in the years 1867 to 1880, which improved only to 53 percent in 1901‒10. In the 1890s, at least 32 percent of population were totally illiterate—a much higher rate than in Canada. In the 1860s, rather than “face the world with pride and confidence,” as Ambrose Shea and Frederick Carter suggested, Newfoundland turned inward to pursue its own economic development.2

Newfoundland was also marked by sectarian and ethnic divisions for much of the nineteenth century and even into the twentieth century. Immigrants came either from the Protestant west of England or the Catholic south of Ireland, although there were small numbers of French, either from France or Acadia, who settled predominantly on the Port-au-Port Peninsula. Most settlers to Newfoundland arrived between 1760 and 1830. The Irish settled mostly on the Avalon Peninsula, the English further north and west, into Conception Bay and along the South Coast; St. John’s became home to both groups who often brought with them the prejudices and hostilities of their homeland and which found their way into the Island’s political life. The sectarian lines became further entrenched with the establishment of denominational schools in 1843, a practice that remained until 1998. The dominant religious groups forged an unwritten agreement in the 1860s for proportionate representation in the Legislature Assembly, in the Executive Council, and in patronage more generally. It was hoped that by informally institutionalizing such sectarian practices the country would be somewhat free of religious animosity.3 Sometimes it worked.

Most of the wealth in Newfoundland was in the hands of a small group of merchants, primarily in St. John’s and Conception Bay. The fisheries operated on a credit system whereby fishers were advanced supplies in the spring, with the hope that at the end of the season the catch was sufficient to settle their account with the merchants. Merchants charged as much as they could for the items advanced on credit and paid as little as possible for the fish delivered in the fall. Most fishers consequently lived in poverty or on its boundaries, but the fish merchants and the country’s elite, known as Water Street merchants, exerted a powerful hold over the country, controlling all aspects of the economy, including local banking and the Island’s meagre manufacturing sector. They also controlled the Legislative Council and their proxies, the Legislative Assembly, and the powerful Chamber of Commerce. They saw the economy, particularly the fisheries, as their own and ensured that the state did not intervene in their domain. As a result—unlike the fisheries of other countries—there was no strict and sustained government regulatory involvement in the sector in Newfoundland until the 1930s.4

The Confederation Debate, 1869

Ambrose Shea and Frederick B. T. Carter were impressed with the notion of Confederation when they gathered with other delegates in Quebec in October 1864, but they found no great enthusiasm for it upon returning to St. John’s. Premier Hugh Hoyles and Governor Anthony Musgrave expressed some interest, but the Newfoundland Assembly was divided. When the 1865 throne speech called for a “calm examination” of union, eighteen members spoke against and twenty-one expressed some support, though the latter also identified problems with the Quebec Resolutions. Merchants and the Roman Catholic Church also opposed the deal.5

Newfoundland had little reason to be excited about continental integration. Its trade and traffic were to Europe and North America’s Eastern Seaboard rather than with Canada and the continent’s interior. There was no fear of an American threat of invasion or of the Fenians as was the case in much of British North America. Moroever, the Royal Navy provided all of the defence Newfoundland needed. Westward continental expansion held no appeal with Newfoundlanders while the promise of a railway from Halifax to Quebec similarly stirred no excitement. Political squabbling and deadlock in the Canadas was not their concern, and Newfoundland’s debt—compared to that of the other colonies—was minimal. Confederation, moreover, was unlikely to resolve the French Shore issue whereby France enjoyed considerable rights in northern and western Newfoundland that had their roots in the eighteenth century. Finally, the terms of union did not allay fears of competition—in fisheries and manufacturing from Canada. Opponents of union believed that Canadian protectionism would have been catastrophic for Newfoundland, and some claimed that if the Canadian tariff of 1864 had been applied to Newfoundland, it would have raised taxes by 44 percent.6

The country’s political elite agreed that the economy had to be diversified, and saw Confederation as possibly providing economic growth, improving social and economic conditions for most citizens, and stemming out-migration from the island. The island’s future economic growth, many felt, lay in the interior of the Island; new investment in mineral and timber resources and in industrialization might boost the productive capacity of the country. Confederation, an arrangement that the British government favoured, might spur Canadian investment in Newfoundland and raise the standards of public services to that of the mainland colonies. Carter was most optimistic and in a speech in the Assembly, he said “ . . . it would be well . . . to travel a little and visit that magnificent province [Canada], as well as Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, which were advancing so rapidly in material prosperity, and in all that tended to make a people great and respected. . . . These countries were all more prosperous than we are.” Confederation would also provide cheaper imports, he promised. Like those who successfully pursued Confederation in 1949, he encouraged voters to “support this confederation on account of their children.” In addition to its economic potential, Carter also hoped that Confederation would bring an end to the religious strife in Newfoundland as it would have Newfoundland’s politicians playing a role on a larger national stage. In 1869, the terms of union were agreed upon by Newfoundland and Canada. Canada was generous, offering just about everything Newfoundland demanded, including a special annual grant of $175,000 for surrendering its Crown lands, a promise that there would be no export levy placed on Newfoundland fish, and even modifications to the Dominion Militia Act that would exempt Newfoundlanders from serving in Canada.7

It was a tired government that entered the fray promoting Confederation in the 1869 election called in part to seek a mandate to complete union with Canada. In power for eight years, the Carter Administration had made unpopular decisions, especially on poor relief during the period of economic distress, even though recovery was well underway by 1869. The government faced, moreover, a determined and vigorous opponent in Charles Fox Bennett, a Protestant Tory and one of the country’s leading merchants. He vowed to protect Newfoundland from the Canadians. To do so, Bennett forged a strange coalition, linking the St. John’s Protestant oligarchy which feared commercial competition from Canada, and Irish Catholics who harboured a profound dislike of the British and had traditionally supported the Liberals. The Irish Catholic minority viewed Confederation as a British plot akin to that of the Act of Union of 1801 that had brought their beloved Ireland under English domination. Bennett played upon those fears and appealed to local patriotism: “The sending of Delegates to Canada,” he said “would be the sacrifice of our independent legislation and the control of our own rich colonial resources for the benefit of that nationality which, so far as I can at present conceive, can confer but few and trifling benefits on us.”8 Shea, who was one of a few Catholics to support Confederation, was deemed a traitor by many of his faith; at Placentia, a Catholic community, he was “met by a priest and people bearing pots of pitch and bags of feathers, and the moaning of cow bells.”9

The election held on 13 November 1869 was marked by sectarianism: all of the country’s Catholic constituencies, and some Protestant ridings, too, voted against Confederation, with anti-Confederates taking twenty-one of the thirty Assembly seats.10 The defeat was overwhelming, and the Conservatives quickly abandoned the idea of union. When Governor Stephen John Hill suggested adding Newfoundland to Canada by imperial fiat, Prime Minister John A. Macdonald declined, recognizing that for the time being the Confederation movement in Newfoundland was dead.11

Confederation, 1869-1939

After 1869, there were further discussions of union between Newfoundland and Canada, but none resulted in union. In the 1890s, when Newfoundland once again faced an economic crisis that devastated its banking sector and led to the demise of several Water Street firms, the government once again contemplated Confederation. The Bank of Montreal subsequently established operations in Newfoundland and helped to stabilize the fiscal and economic crisis. Worried that Newfoundland might forge an independent reciprocity treaty with the United States, Canada expressed some interest in union, but it worried that the associated costs and opposition to the French Shore in Newfoundland had the potential to generate additional political discontent, particularly in Quebec if the federal government intervened on the island’s behalf.12

In 1906, as Newfoundland Prime Minister Robert Bond quarrelled with Britain and Canada over reciprocity and fishing rights with the Americans, some in Canada and in Great Britain again encouraged union between the two countries. Lord Grey, the Governor General of Canada, and Lord Elgin, the British Colonial Secretary, promoted union as did the Newfoundland Governor Sir William MacGregor, officials at the Bank of Montreal, the Canadian iron ore companies, and the Reid Family of Montreal that had secured a monopoly on the Newfoundland Railway in 1898. They hoped that Edward Morris would break with Bond—who had earlier used his own money to save the colony from bankruptcy—and lead the campaign for Confederation in the 1908 election, but Morris recognized Confederation’s unpopularity. In that campaign, both parties accused each other of being insincere in their opposition to union, and even though it was a tied result, Morris formed a majority government in 1909 but had no interest in promoting Confederation. Confederation arose again during the economic and political turmoil in the 1930s that eventually led Newfoundland to surrender responsible government in 1933. Charles A. Magrath, a Canada banker and a member of the Newfoundland Royal Commission, wrote Canadian Prime Minister R.B. Bennett suggesting that Newfoundland’s destiny lay with Canada and urged “generosity on the part of Canada.” With Canada’s own economic and fiscal situation deteriorating rapidly, however, Confederation would not be an option during the Great Depression.13

Canada and Newfoundland Rekindle Interest in Union, 1939-45

Canada’s attitude towards Newfoundland changed during the Second World War. The United States had, through the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement with Great Britain, secured a ninety-nine-year lease to construct several military bases in Newfoundland, and Canada was determined not to be shut out of Newfoundland to have an Alaska on its eastern flank. Officials in the Canadian Department of External Affairs pushed Prime Minister Mackenzie King to be more proactive on Newfoundland, and he announced subsequently that Newfoundland would be included in Canada’s defence preparations. He also made it clear that Canada would welcome Newfoundland into Confederation “should they make their decision clear and beyond all possibility of misunderstanding.”14 Canada appointed its first High Commissioner to Newfoundland in 1941, a clear sign of its growing interest in the country. At the same time, Britain realized that it could not afford to pay for postwar reconstruction in Newfoundland, and believed that union with Canada was the best solution. King remained cautious on Newfoundland, however, and was worried that its addition might spur political turmoil, especially in the Maritime Provinces, if Ottawa offered terms of union that were more generous than contemporary agreements with the Maritimes. On several occasions in 1945, King and his officials, nonetheless, suggested that if the British withheld financial assistance, it might “assist Newfoundlanders to turn their thoughts to Canada.” King continued to insist, however, that “Newfoundland could not be forced into Confederation.”15

Reconsidering Confederation During the 1940s

Newfoundland had been governed by a British-appointed Commission of Government since 1933, and it became solvent during the economic boom created by the Second World War with a forty-million dollar surplus. The future for the country was far from secure, however, and by the end of the war there was little public appetite to continue with the Commission of Government. After all, the war had been fought for freedom and democracy. Democracy had to be restored in Newfoundland. Yet, the wartime boom had seen “no new productive capacity to help sustain the economy in peacetime” and no new alternative sources of employment.16 On almost any index—from employment rates, income per capita, education levels, hospital beds, electrification, or number of indoor flush toilets—Newfoundland ranked below any jurisdiction in Canada. The Newfoundland Tuberculosis Association claimed in 1948, for instance, that the country’s health services equalled those of England and Wales in 1910. More than ten thousand suffered from tuberculosis in Newfoundland, but its sanatoria could accommodate less than four hundred. Death rates exceeded those in Canada: the Newfoundland death rate per 100,000 of population was 122.0 while Ontario’s was 25.7, Nova Scotia at 62.4, and Quebec’s at 72.4. Infant mortality was much higher than that in the Maritime Provinces, and total public hospital expenditure in 1946 ($1.68 million) paled in comparison to New Brunswick’s ($4.13 million) and Nova Scotia’s ($5.06 million).17

On 11 December 1945 British Prime Minister Clement Atlee announced the formation of a National Convention to study Newfoundland’s economic and social conditions and then recommend possible forms of future government to the British government. It would then put several constitutional options before the people in a national referendum.18 Attlee imposed a residency requirement for election to the National Convention, fearing vested interests might otherwise control the body.19 Less than 50 percent of eligible voters cast a ballot in the National Convention elections on 21 June 1946. The new body first met on September 11 and deliberated for the next eighteen months; its debates were broadcast nightly on the Newfoundland Broadcasting Corporation. Nine investigative committees studied various aspects of Newfoundland’s economy, government, and society, and the reports stimulated considerable debate in the Convention and throughout the country as audiences considered how their country would transition from war to peace and, at the same time, find economic and political stability. The Convention awakened Newfoundlanders to some harsh realities, including their poverty and the comparative lack of public services.20

Two groups emerged during the National Convention proceedings. The larger group advocated returning to responsible government and restoring democracy. A smaller group rallied around the promise of Confederation, arguing that responsible government had collapsed, in part, because the population had been demoralized by the state’s long-term neglect.21 This group focussed on the problems facing the country, and demanded that the state introduce a series of programmes to address citizens’ social and economic needs. Joseph R. Smallwood and F. Gordon Bradley were already proponents of Confederation, and they became the leaders of a small group within the Convention who believed that Newfoundland, like other countries such as Britain and Canada, must also adopt a form of government that included an expansion of social rights and the provision of social security programs that would see the implementation of such programs as family allowances and veterans’ benefits to citizens. The supporters of Confederation promoted a new relationship between the state and its citizens.

Smallwood became the de facto leader of the Confederates. His first speech to the Convention proposed sending a delegation to Ottawa to investigate the possibility of Confederation; it was also a plea to extend social citizenship to Newfoundland. In that speech, which might be titled “We are not a Nation,” Smallwood fully embraced the necessity of a new social citizenship. “In the North American family Newfoundland bears the reputation of having the lowest standards of life, of being the least progressive and advanced of the whole family,” he said. “Our people never enjoyed a good standard of living, and never were able to yield enough taxes to maintain the government. . . . We are not a nation. . . . We are living in a world in which small countries have less chance than ever before of surviving. . . . Confederation I will support if it means a higher standard of living for our people.”22 This was the major narrative of his Confederation campaign.

Although Smallwood’s resolution on 28 October 1946 to send a delegation to Ottawa failed, a wider resolution introduced on 4 February 1947 to send delegations to London and Ottawa succeeded. The governor rejected another resolution to send representatives to Washington in hopes of negotiating an economic union with the United States. The delegation that travelled to London found no support for an independent Newfoundland. The delegation to Ottawa sought to learn whether a fair and equitable basis could be found for federal union of Newfoundland and Canada. It was greeted enthusiastically. Bradley, who had been a Confederate since his studies at Dalhousie University in 1914, chaired the meetings in Ottawa. He had written earlier “I don’t care two straws for Newfoundland as an abstraction.” He believed that Newfoundland as “small, remote and economically weak . . . [and] could not survive and prosper was an independent unit.”23 Like Shea and Carter decades earlier, Bradley believed Confederation might address Newfoundland’s peculiar economic and social situation.

Canada welcomed union with Newfoundland for several reasons. Its inclusion would fulfill the Canadian dreams of 1867 to thwart any designs the Americans might have on Newfoundland. It would bring considerable resource wealth, including expansive fisheries, mineral and potential hydro-electric resources. It would also safeguard the Newfoundland market for Canadian exporters, valued at between twenty-five and forty million dollars, and it would also secure Canadian defence and civil aviation privileges in Newfoundland. Ottawa’s only concern was the financial cost of union.

The Canadian and Newfoundland delegations agreed upon the “Proposed Arrangements for the Entry of Newfoundland into Confederation.” On 29 October 1947 when King despatched to Sir Gordon MacDonald, governor of Newfoundland, the proposed terms, he wrote “I feel I must emphasize that as far as the financial aspects of the proposed arrangements for union are concerned, the Government of Canada believes that the arrangements go as far as the Government can go under the circumstances.” Yet, on matters of primarily provincial concern, such as education, he said that “Canada would not wish to set down any rigid conditions, and it would be prepared to give reasonable consideration to suggestions for modification or addition.”24 The “Proposed Arrangements” were presented to the National Convention on 6 November 1947.25

Debate in National Convention on Constitutional Options

Debate in the National Convention on the Canadian proposal began on 20 November 1947 and continued for thirty-four days, generating considerable interest across Newfoundland and Labrador.26 “These terms,” Smallwood said in his final speech to the National Convention, “would make a new country for the people of Newfoundland—a new country where . . . the poor man would have a chance to live and breathe, a chance to bring up his family decently. The terms would give our people a chance, and that is something they have never had yet.” As a small nation, Smallwood asserted, Newfoundland could not prosper on its own; Canada promised security and an improved standard of living as well as a return to responsible and a democratically elected government.27

The National Convention debated the inclusion of responsible government for four days. On 19 January 1948 the Convention unanimously passed a resolution introduced by Gordon Higgins recommending that both Responsible Government—as it existed in 1933—as well as the continuation of the Commission of Government be placed before the electorate in a national referendum. Smallwood then moved that Confederation also appear on the ballot, but it was defeated twenty-nine to sixteen. The Confederates reacted by launching an appeal to the country for Confederation’s inclusion. Even before the governor received over twenty-four thousand telegrams demanding Confederation be placed on the ballot, the British Government (which had long favoured the union of Newfoundland with Canada) decided that all three options be included in the referendum.

Referendum Campaigns

In the referendum campaigns that followed, the Confederate Association led the fight for union with Canada. Those who wanted to return to responsible government fell into two groups that often shared resources and people: the Responsible Government League (RGL) and the Economic Union Association (EUA) which campaigned for an economic union with the United States, though that option was not on the ballot. It had first to achieve responsible government and then work for an economic union. There was no organized campaign for Commission of Government.

The Responsible Government League (RGL) was established in St. John’s on 11 February 1947. It was dedicated to securing the return of “Responsible Government for Newfoundland and to encourag[ing] the people of Newfoundland to accept their full, personal and collective responsibilities for the good government of our country.” The RGL was perceived as an organ of Newfoundland’s business and professional elite. Nearly all of the founding members came from this particular group and many who later joined were primarily merchants with close ties to Water Street.28

The Responsible Government League never embraced the notions of social citizenship then circulating throughout much of the developed world. In fact, J.S. Currie, the owner of the Daily News and stalwart advocate for the return of responsible government, said “people should accept the responsibility of self-government with the restraints and discipline that it should impose on the individual.” Many in the RGL worried that “materialism” had become the order of the day, and insisted that even if Newfoundland did not possess the material wealth that other nations enjoyed, it might be better off. Materialism, the RGL members often asserted, breeds selfishness and greed and embitters the lives of great sections of the populations and gives rise to avaricious politicians. The RGL believed that citizens were content with the level of services that the current tax system could support and accused the Confederates of bribing voters with the promise of Canada’s social programs.29

The RGL faced an uphill struggle. First, responsible government was not remembered with any great enthusiasm by voters, and it had become associated with the economic deprivation that many had experienced in the 1920s and 1930s. The Hollis Walker report of 1924, for instance, had been charged with investigating alleged corruption in several government departments, and provided not only an indictment of a number of individuals but also of a political system that allowed such actions within the state apparatus. Less than a decade later, the Newfoundland Royal Commission (the Amulree Commission) also popularized the notion that Newfoundland’s experiment with responsible government had resulted in widespread corruption and mismanagement. The RGL inherited all of the negativity associated with responsible government.

On the other hand, the Confederate Association, established on 21 February 1948, emphasized the social benefits of Confederation, stressing how Canadian social programs and a general higher standard of living would improve the lives of all Newfoundlanders. It also waged a well-organized and effective campaign. Its ideas were communicated over the radio and in a successful tabloid, The Confederate, first published on April 7 and whose appealing political cartoons were professionally drawn by a Globe and Mail cartoonist under Smallwood’s direction. The 31 May 1948 edition of The Confederate asked voters “to give yourself a chance. Give the Children a chance. Give Newfoundland a chance. Vote for Confederation and a healthier, happier Newfoundland.” To mothers, Smallwood and the Confederates promised the benefits of a modern social state, claiming “Confederation would mean that NEVER AGAIN would there be a hungry child in Newfoundland.” He also reminded parents that their children under the age of sixteen would receive “EVERY MONTH a cash allowance for every child you have or may have.”30

Smallwood travelled widely throughout the campaign and wrote open letters to a large number of communities that he could not visit. He explained in a 29 May 1948 letter “To the People of Lower Island Cove” why he favoured Confederation: “It is the people who earn small incomes who will benefit the most by Confederation. They are the ones who deserve our greatest consideration: because they get very little out of life.” He suggested further that those who argued for a return to responsible government had not considered the interests of others: “Don’t forget the struggle is between a better living for you, or more profits for the merchants and a still lowering of your standard of living. It is a struggle in which you have only one advantage, and that is the ballot paper.” He asked voters to compare their situations with their relatives in Canada, and “you know they are enjoying a better standard of living than here.” His message was clear: “I ask you in all sincerity to consider carefully the issue. Your decision will mean a better standard of living for you if you vote for Confederation.” Smallwood made similar arguments during his radio broadcasts.31

The RGL never matched the Confederate Association in attracting support in rural Newfoundland because it failed to present to the voters an alternative to the St. John’s dominated political system that had failed in 1933. Many voters in rural and outport Newfoundland harboured a great deal of resentment towards St. John’s and were not attracted to “responsible government as it existed in 1933”. The RGL also failed to create a country-wide political organization and did not campaign aggressively outside the Avalon Peninsula. Nor did it present an economic and social agenda to compete with the prospect of Newfoundland’s membership in Canada. Thus, by opting for union with Canada, voters were effectively rejecting the political system that had existed before the establishment of Commission of Government.

The results of the first referendum on 3 June 1948 failed to produce a majority for either side, though Responsible Government led with 44.5 percent of the vote to Confederation’s 41.1 percent. Commission of Government with 14.3 percent was dropped from the second referendum held on 22 July 1948 which gave Confederation a narrow victory with 52.3 percent of the vote. Responsible Government won in seven districts, all on the Avalon Peninsula while the Confederates carried the remainder of the country. Because most of the support for Responsible Government came from districts with Catholic majorities, it might appear that denominationalism was the deciding factor in the referendum.32 It was not; region was decisive. Sixty-six percent of voters on the Avalon Peninsula supported Responsible Government, compared to 34 percent for Confederation; the rest of the Island voted 70 percent for Confederation. Two Avalon districts, those furthest from St. John’s (Port de Grave and Carbonear-Bay de Verde), voted Confederation and two predominantly Catholic districts off the Avalon Peninsula (Placentia West and St. George’s-Port-au-Port) supported Confederation. Catholic votes outside the Avalon Peninsula may have carried Confederation to victory. Still, Catholic and Protestant organizations exchanged a number of barbs during the campaign leading to the second referendum. As Jeff A. Webb suggests, Newfoundlanders held different conceptions of national identity and different political and economic expectations depending on their place of residence.33 While those on the Avalon Peninsula were committed to a Newfoundland state, many outside of the Avalon Peninsula were not. Perhaps also pivotal to the outcome was the decision of several well-known members of the economic elite as well as several of the Newfoundland members of the Commission of Government to embrace Confederation. More important, Confederation was a vote for the welfare state which a return to responsible government could not deliver because of the limitations of the local economy.

Newfoundland’s Delegation to Ottawa, 1948

On 27 July 1948, the Canada government announced that it would accept Newfoundland as a province and preparations began in St. John’s and in Ottawa for the final negotiations between the two countries. The 1948 Newfoundland delegation to Ottawa was chaired by Albert J. Walsh of the Commission of Government. It also included Smallwood and Bradley, and was primarily concerned with the financial prospects of Newfoundland after union. Even though Canada had insisted that the amount of the subsidy offered to Newfoundland was proportionately higher than that paid to any of the Maritime Provinces, the delegation worried that Newfoundland’s fiscal capacity would be insufficient to meet normal expenditures as a province of Canada.34 Its memorandum to the Canadian government pointed out that the level of public services in Newfoundland was below that of any Province of Canada and even without including for new services, Newfoundland would face a deficit of approximately ten million dollars per annum within four years of union (when it was expected that its surplus of approximately forty million dollars would be exhausted). The delegation warned that the existence of such a financial gap would result in an unworkable union.

The Newfoundland and Canadian delegations first met on 6 October 1948. The meetings were not a series of negotiations between the two delegations, but more of a discussion of how Newfoundland might fit into the existing Canadian system. Canada did not bargain directly with the Newfoundland delegation, trying to ascertain what price had to be paid to induce the Newfoundlanders to join. The Canadian government had decided what was fair, reasonable, and compatible given the arrangements that existed in the Maritime Provinces and left it to the Newfoundland delegation to decide whether it was justified in recommending union.35

On 22 November 1948 the two sides began drafting an agreement that became the Terms of Union. On the fiscal side, Newfoundland won a small victory. Canada increased the twelve-year sliding transitional subsidy in the 1947 proposals from twenty-six to forty-two million dollars. Canada also promised in Term 29 a review of Newfoundland’s finances after eight years of union, but Newfoundland did not insist on playing a role in that investigation. On December 11 the two sides completed their work, but one member of the Newfoundland delegation, Chesley Crosbie, refused to sign, claiming that the arrangement did not secure Newfoundland’s financial future. Smallwood, too, realized that some uncertainties about Newfoundland’s financial future remained, but he believed that Canada and Newfoundland would address any lingering problems over fiscal matters through Term 29.

The Canadian Parliament passed the appropriate legislation by the end of February 1949, which allowed the British Parliament to pass the Newfoundland Act, providing for the union of Newfoundland and Canada. By the time Newfoundland became a province on 1 April 1949, the Government of Canada had already made arrangement for the integration of Newfoundland, including the payment of Canada’s social programmes in the first month of union. Little attention was paid to the Indigenous Peoples in Newfoundland and Labrador during the negotiations leading to union in 1949, and there was considerable ignorance of the affairs of Indigenous Peoples even if they had full rights of citizenship. It was decided to settle the administration of Indigenous Affairs after Confederation, when the Indian Act was proclaimed in Newfoundland, but only in 1987 did the Conne River Miawpukek become a reserve under the Indian Act, and in 2013 did the Government of Canada recognize the Qalipu Mi’kmaq Band as a landless band for the Mi’kmaq of Newfoundland. In 2007 the Innu of Labrador won recognition for its members as status Indians under Canada’s Indian Act, but land claims remain an issue of contention.36

From its earliest days, Newfoundland faced many difficult economic problems, and poverty was abundantly evident throughout the country. In 1869, voters rejected Confederation as the best path forward because of concerns over the economic costs of union with Canada and because of the opposition of Irish and Catholic voters. In 1949, however, Smallwood and other Confederates won a narrow victory by promising a variety of programs already provided throughout Canada by the federal government. Those who supported Confederation in 1869 and 1949 believed that union with Canada held the best promise of a decent, prosperous future with a better and more secure standard of living than they had enjoyed as an independent country. As Smallwood often repeated throughout his long political career, “Newfoundland joined Canada mostly for Newfoundland’s sake. Newfoundland was the smaller of the two, the poorer of the two, the weaker of the two; and it was because we believed that Newfoundland would get the better of the bargain that Newfoundlanders agreed to unite their country with Canada.”37 In 1949, a majority of Newfoundlanders hoped that would be the case and voted to join Canada.

Further Reading:

Baker, Melvin. “Falling into the Canadian Lap: The Confederation of Newfoundland and Canada, 1945–49.” In Royal Commission on Renewing and Strengthening our Place in Canada. Research Volume 1. St. John’s: Office of the Queen’s Printer, 2003, 29-88.

Blake, Raymond B. Canadians as Last: Canada Integrates Newfoundland as a Province. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.

Bridle, Paul, ed. Documents on Relations Between Canada and Newfoundland. Vol. 2, 1940–1949. Confederation, Part II. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1984.

Hiller, James. “Confederation Defeated: The Newfoundland Election of 1869.” In Newfoundland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Essays in Interpretation. Edited by James Hiller and Peter Neary. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.

Hiller, J. K and M.F. Harrington, eds. The Newfoundland National Convention, 1946–1948. Debates. Volume 1. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995.

MacKenzie, David. Inside the Atlantic Triangle. Canada and the Entrance of Newfoundland into Confederation, 1939–1949. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986.

Neary, Peter. Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988.

Webb, Jeff A. “The Responsible Government League and the Confederation Campaigns of 1948.” Newfoundland Studies 5, no. 2 (1989): 203–20.

notes

1 James K. Hiller, “Newfoundland Confronts Canada, 1867–1949,” in The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation, eds. Ernest Forbes and D.A. Muse (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 351–2.

2 David Alexander, “Literacy and Economic Development in Nineteenth Century Newfoundland,” in Atlantic Canada and Confederation. Essays in Canadian Political Economy, compiled by Eric Sager et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 113 and 137. These points are also made in S.J.R. Noel, Politics in Newfoundland (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971).

3 Noel, Politics in Newfoundland, 23–25.

4 Hiller, “Newfoundland Confronts Canada, 1867–1949,” 352–55.

5 Phillip Buckner, “The 1860s: An End and a Beginning,” in The Atlantic Region to Confederation: A History, eds. Phillip Buckner and John G. Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 382–83.

6 James K. Hiller, “Confederation Defeated: The Newfoundland Election of 1869,” in Newfoundland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Essays in Interpretation, eds. James Hiller and Peter Neary (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 75.

7 H.B. Mayo, “Newfoundland and Confederation in the Eighteen-Sixties,” Canadian Historical Review 29 (1948): 125–42.

8 C. F. Bennett to The Newfoundlander, December 5, 1864. http://www.heritage.nf.ca/articles/politics/charles-bennett-objections.php.

9 Hiller, “Confederation Defeated: The Newfoundland Election of 1869,” 79.

10 Frederick Jones, “The Antis Gain the Day,” in The Causes of Canadian Confederation, ed. Ged Martin (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1990), 147, and Buckner, “The 1860s: An End and a Beginning,” 383.

11 J. K. Johnson and P. B. Waite, “Macdonald, Sir John Alexander,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 12, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed 4 February 2017, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/macdonald_john_alexander_12E.html.

12 Hiller, “Newfoundland Confronts Canada, 1867–1949,” 360.

13 Quoted in Noel, Politics in Newfoundland, 211.

14 Paul Bridle, ed., Documents on the Relations between Canada and Newfoundland, vol. 2, 1940–49, Confederation (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1984), 73–74.

15 Raymond B. Blake, Canadians at Last: Canada Integrates Newfoundland as a Province (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 11–14.

16 Noel, Politics in Newfoundland, 263.

17 Rooms Provincial Archives (RPA), GN 154, Newfoundland Delegation to Ottawa (1948) Fonds, GN 154.6, Memorandum from the Newfoundland Tuberculosis Association to Ottawa Delegation, September 1948.

18 Great Britain, House of Commons Debates, 11 December 1945, 210–11.

19 Peter Neary, “Clement Attlee’s Visit to Newfoundland, September 1942,” Acadiensis 13, no. 2 (1984): 101–09; Nicklaus Thomas-Symonds, Attlee: A Life in Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

20 Newfoundland National Convention, 1946–1948, vol. 6: Report of the Fisheries Committee of the National Convention: 47–48. Digital Archives Initiative link: http://collections.mun.ca/PDFs/cns/NationalConventionReportsAgriculture1946-1948.pdf.

21 Great Britain, Newfoundland Royal Commission 1933: Report (London: HMSO, 1933). See also, Peter Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988), and Noel, Politics in Newfoundland.

22 Joseph R. Smallwood, I Chose Canada. The Memoirs of the Honourable Joseph R. “Joey” Smallwood (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973), 255–61.

23 J.K. Hiller, “The Career of F. Gordon Bradley,” Newfoundland Studies 4, no. 2 (1988): 165.

24 Bridle, Documents, vol. 2, Confederation. Part 1, 682–83.

25 RPA, Albert Walsh Fonds, MG 302.13, Box 1, Meetings between Delegates from the National Convention of Newfoundland and Representatives of The Government of Canada, Summary of Proceedings, Part II, Ottawa, 25 June–29 September 1947, 67–69.

26 Bridle, Documents, vol. 2, Confederation, Part I, 526 and 528.

27 Hiller and Harrington, eds., The Newfoundland National Convention, vol. 1, 1187, reproduced by The Confederation Debates, http://hcmc.uvic.ca/confederation/en/lgNFNC_1948-01-14.html.

28 Quoted in Jeff A. Webb, “The Responsible Government League and the Confederation Campaigns of 1948,” Newfoundland Studies 5, no. 2 (1989): 205.

29 Centre for Newfoundland Studies Archives, Memorial University, Senator John G. Higgins Collection, Coll. 0-87, Box 19, file 3.01.032, Speech by J.S. Currie, 14 February 1948; file 3.01.033, Broadcast Speech by A.B. Butt, 10 April 1948; Radio Speech, F.W. Marshall, Dominion President of the Great War Veterans’ Association, 5 May 1948; Radio Speech by Frank Fogwill, 6 March 1948.

30 Peter Neary, ed., Political Economy of Newfoundland (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1973), 140–41.

31 Centre for Newfoundland Studies Archives, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Coll-075, J.R. Smallwood Papers, Box 299, file 4.01.001 Nfld. Confederate Association, “To the People of Lower Island Cove from C.F. Garland (Secretary Treasurer, Confederate Association), 29 May 1948. Letter from Confederate Headquarters; and file 4.01.004 Speech, “Why I favour Confederation,” 6 April 1948 and 23 April 1948.

32 Patrick O’Flaherty, Leaving the Past Behind. Newfoundland History from 1934 (St. John’s: Long Beach Press, 2011), 193–98.

33 Jeff A. Webb, “Confederation, Conspiracy and Choice: A Discussion,” Newfoundland Studies 14, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 169–87.

34 The Rooms, GN 154, Newfoundland Delegation to Ottawa (1948), GN 154.1, Minutes, 25 August–24 September 1948, Minutes 28 August 1948.

35 Blake, Canadians At Last, 29–30.

36 David Mackenzie, “The Indian Act and the Aboriginal Peoples of Newfoundland at the Time of Confederation,” Newfoundland and Labrador Studies 25, no. 2 (2010): 161–81, and Peter Neary, “The First Nations and the Entry of Newfoundland into Confederation, 1945–54, Part 1,” Newfoundland Quarterly 105, no. 2 (Fall 2012): 36–42.

37 Smallwood Papers, Coll-075, file 4.03.007, Speech by Smallwood during the 1959 election campaign, no date, 3.