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The Material Mind: BSPS Open Series

The Material Mind
BSPS Open Series
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table of contents
  1. Half Title Page
  2. BSPS Open Series
  3. Title Page
  4. Copyright Page
  5. Contents
  6. List of Figures
  7. Foreword and Acknowledgements
  8. Introduction
  9. Chapter 1: Unity of Science and Reduction
    1. 1. Introduction
    2. 2. Deductive and Ontological Unification
    3. 3. The Deductive-Nomological Model of Reduction
    4. 4. The Model of Reduction by Analogy
    5. 5. The Reduction of Thermodynamics to Classical Mechanics
    6. 6. The Synthetic Model of Reduction
    7. 7. The Reduction of Cognitive Phenomena by Neurophysiology: Elimination or Co-Evolution?
    8. 8. Conclusion
  10. Chapter 2: Can Reductive Explanations Be Constructed A Priori?
    1. 1. Introduction
    2. 2. A Priori Reduction in the Framework of Two-Dimensional Semantics
    3. 3. Two Concepts of Reduction and Realization: Micro-Macro and Role-Occupant
    4. 4. Multi-Realizability
    5. 5. Conclusion
  11. Chapter 3: Cognitive Abilities as Macroscopic Dispositional Properties
    1. 1. Introduction
    2. 2. General Arguments against the Efficacy of Dispositions
    3. 3. Dispositional and Theoretical Properties
    4. 4. The Epiphenomenal Trilemma of Macroscopic Dispositions
    5. 5. The Example of Colour Representation
    6. 6. Dispositional Properties with Multiple Manifestations
    7. 7. Conclusion
  12. Chapter 4: Emergent Properties
    1. 1. Introduction
    2. 2. Minimal Conditions and Weak Emergence
    3. 3. Broad and the Epistemic Conception of Emergence
    4. 4. Strong Emergence in Terms of the Impossibility of Deduction
    5. 5. Emergence as Non-Aggregativity
    6. 6. Emergence in Terms of Non-Linear Interaction and Mill’s Principle of the Composition of Causes
    7. 7. Qualitative and Quantitative Difference
    8. 8. The Limits of Explaining Emergent Properties
    9. 9. Avoiding Panpsychism
    10. 10. Response to a Version of Kripke’s Argument against the Identity Theory
    11. 11. Emergence, Reduction, and Supervenience
    12. 12. Conclusion
  13. Chapter 5: The Causal Efficacy of High-Level Properties
    1. 1. Introduction
    2. 2. Causality, Causal Responsibility, and Causal Explanation
    3. 3. Mental Causation and Downward Causation
      1. 3.1. Macrocausation without an Underlying Microscopic Mechanism
      2. 3.2. Kim’s Argument against Mental Causation: Preliminaries
      3. 3.3. The First Part of Kim’s Argument: No Mental Causation without Downward Causation
      4. 3.4. The Second Part of Kim’s Argument: No Downward Causation
    4. 4. Mental Properties or Physical Properties Conceived with Mental Concepts?
    5. 5. Conclusion
  14. Conclusion
  15. References
  16. Index

Logo: BSPS Open

BSPS Open Series

Series Editors:

Bryan W. Roberts, Professor of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science

David Teira, Catedrático de Filosofía de la Ciencia, Dpto. de Lógica, Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia, UNED (Madrid)

ISSN 2564-3169 (Print) ISSN 2564-3177 (Online)

BSPS Open publishes landmark, cutting edge works that represent the full breadth and diversity of the philosophy of science. Diamond Open Access, all books in this series are available freely to readers everywhere.

Published in collaboration with the British Society for the Philosophy of Science.

No. 1 The Material Theory of Induction John D. Norton

No. 2 The Large-Scale Structure of Inductive Inference John D. Norton

No. 3 The Material Mind: Reduction and Emergence Max Kistler

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