Contents
Chapter 1: Unity of Science and Reduction
2. Deductive and Ontological Unification
3. The Deductive-Nomological Model of Reduction
4. The Model of Reduction by Analogy
5. The Reduction of Thermodynamics to Classical Mechanics
6. The Synthetic Model of Reduction
7. The Reduction of Cognitive Phenomena by Neurophysiology: Elimination or Co-Evolution?
Chapter 2: Can Reductive Explanations Be Constructed A Priori?
2. A Priori Reduction in the Framework of Two-Dimensional Semantics
3. Two Concepts of Reduction and Realization: Micro-Macro and Role Occupation
Chapter 3: Cognitive Abilities as Macroscopic Dispositional Properties
2. General Arguments against the Efficacy of Dispositions
3. Dispositional and Theoretical Properties
4. The Epiphenomenal Trilemma of Macroscopic Dispositions
5. The Example of Colour Representation
6. Dispositional Properties with Multiple Manifestations
Chapter 4: Emergent Properties
2. Minimal Conditions and Weak Emergence
3. Broad and the Epistemic Conception of Emergence
4. Strong Emergence in Terms of the Impossibility of Deduction
5. Emergence as Non-Aggregativity
6. Emergence in Terms of Non-Linear Interaction and Mill’s Principle of the Composition of Causes
7. Qualitative and Quantitative Difference
8. The Limits of Explaining Emergent Properties
10. Response to a Version of Kripke’s Argument against the Identity Theory
11. Emergence, Reduction, and Supervenience
Chapter 5: The Causal Efficacy of High-Level Properties
2. Causality, Causal Responsibility, and Causal Explanation
3. Mental Causation and Downward Causation
3.1. Macrocausation without an Underlying Microscopic Mechanism
3.2. Kim’s Argument against Mental Causation: Preliminaries
3.3. First Part of Kim’s Argument: No Mental Causation without Downward Causation
3.4. Second Part of Kim’s Argument: No Downward Causation
4. Mental Properties or Physical Properties Conceived with Mental Concepts?